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Hungarian Volunteers from Canada in the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 
Myron Momryk 
On May 25, 1998, the Canadian House of Commons voted on a motion to give 
"...to the members of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and other Canadians 
who fought with Spanish Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War between 
1936 and 1939, the status of veterans under the federal legislation and making 
them eligible for veterans' pensions and benefits."1 This motion was defeated 
but it evoked some strong reactions in the House of Commons and in the local 
press either supporting or condemning this motion.2 These reactions provide a 
hint of the emotions which ruled the political arena in the 1930's especially when 
the Spanish Civil War was discussed. 
The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, between the Popular Front Republican 
Government and the insurgent forces led by General Francisco Franco, was 
interpreted then, and subsequently, as an epic struggle between the forces of 
democracy and fascism, progress and reaction, good and evil. One of the 
enduring legends and myths of this war was the crucial role played by the 
International Brigades in defending the Popular Front Republican Government. 
There were over fourteen hundred volunteers from Canada, including a large 
number from the various Canadian ethnocultural groups who fought in the ranks 
of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and in several other units of the Interna-
tional Brigades.' Canadian participation in the Spanish Civil War has attracted 
only limited attention from Canadian historians and the specific Hungarian 
Canadian story remains virtually unknown.4 
There are several reasons for this lack of historical information. All 
records of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and the International Brigades 
disappeared with the defeat of the Republican Government in early 1939. His-
torical information that was subsequently available could be found in published 
popular histories, memoirs and autobiographies, obituaries, archival collections of 
Spanish Civil War veterans' associations and lists of volunteers.'1 It was only in 
1994 that the National Archives of Canada acquired microfilm reels of most of 
the Canadian portion of the International Brigades archives in Moscow. Also, 
files from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Records on the Cana-
dian volunteers in the International Brigades were made available in recent years 
to researchers at the National Archives of Canada.6 As a result, there are now 
additional sources from which to create a profile of the Canadians in Spain; 
however, biographical information on all the Canadian volunteers continues to be 
sparse. In the Moscow files, there are questionnaires completed in 1937 and 
1938 by many of the Canadian volunteers including their political evaluations. 
Through the examination of these questionnaires, it is possible to identify some 
of the Hungarian volunteers. The available biographical information differs for 
each volunteer and nothing in fact is known about many of them except their 
names and that they served in Spain. However, enough data exists among all 
these sources to draw a tentative profile of the Hungarian volunteers from 
Canada in the International Brigades. 
The Spanish Civil War began on July 18, 1936 with the revolt of the 
military leadership in Spanish Morocco. The military, supported by an alliance 
of landowners, monarchists and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, opposed 
the growing socialist and anti-clerical tendencies of the Popular Front Republican 
Government. With most of the army in revolt, the Republican Government did 
not have any significant armed forces for its own defence. 
Almost immediately, the insurgents were able to obtain military aid from 
Nazi Germany in the form of military aircraft. Later, the insurgents received 
many tens of thousands of 'volunteers' from Fascist Italy who were in fact 
trained soldiers. The Republican Government, more specifically the various 
political parties and movements including the Communist Party of Spain, began 
to organize militias from among their own followers to defend the government. 
These militias also included the first foreign volunteers and German and French 
units were soon established. 
The Communist Party of Spain (CPS) believed that a large international 
expedition would generate widespread headlines and support for the Republican 
cause. The CPS began to organize the foreign volunteers and, through the 
Communist International in Moscow, a worldwide recruiting network was 
created/ In Canada, reports on the Spanish Civil War appeared in the popular 
press and the involvement of international volunteers was reported in almost 
every issue of the pro-communist newspapers including the Daily Clarion. In 
the Hungarian left-wing community, news of events from Spain was published in 
the Kanadai Magyar Munkds [Canadian Hungarian Worker], The first large 
group of international volunteers arrived in Spain in October and the first 
organized group of volunteers from North America arrived in December, 1936. 
Perhaps the earliest major battle where the International Brigades played a 
significant role was the defence of Madrid.8 During the winter of 1936-37, the 
volunteers were organized into military units according to language groups and 
national origin. In February, 1937, the Abraham Lincoln Battalion was orga-
nized and in May, the George Washington Battalion was formed to include the 
North American volunteers. 
By April, 1937, there were sufficient Canadian volunteers in American 
and other units and they submitted a formal petition to the headquarters of the 
International Brigades requesting to form their own unit. The name selected was 
Mackenzie-Papineau, in recognition of the leaders of the 1837 Rebellions in 
Upper and Lower Canada. By the lime the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion of the 
15th International Brigade was formally organized on July 1, 1937, over five 
hundred Canadians had volunteered for Spain. Although the Battalion was 
nominally Canadian, it was really an international unit composed largely of 
Americans and other English-speaking volunteers including a large percentage of 
Spanish soldiers. Canadians also served in medical corps, armour and artillery 
units and in other American and European units. 
On May 20, 1937, an association called the Friends of the Mackenzie-
Papincau Battalion was established in Canada to support the volunteers in Spain. 
Most Canadian cities also had Spanish Aid Committees which corresponded with 
the volunteers overseas, sent, telegrams to Ottawa in an attempt to influence 
Canadian government policy towards Spain, organized speaking tours and 
Spanish Aid Weeks, raised funds for medical supplies and ambulances, collectcd 
parcels and produced articles for publication in the popular press. Members of 
the Canadian left-wing movement also wrote letters to Canadian politicians in 
support of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and the Spanish Republican cause.y 
In the final report submitted in March, 1939 by the Friends of the 
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion Committee, the number of Canadian volunteers 
was given as 1,239. More recently, a "Mac-Pap" veteran, Lee Burke, compiled 
a list with 1,438 names. In the research for the book. Canadian Volunteers, the 
number was estimated at 1,448 Canadians. Among this number, names of 86 
Hungarian volunteers from Canada were identified.10 
The Canadian federal government followed the British foreign policy of 
non-intervention in the Spanish conflict. In reaction to this volunteer movement, 
the Canadian government indicated in January, 1937, that the Imperial Foreign 
Enlistment Act would be revised to control enlistment in Canada for military 
service in foreign countries. Recruiting for Spain, which was largely a low-
profile enterprise, went underground. In western Canada, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) became suspicious when surprisingly large numbers of 
young men applied for passports for travel to Europe." Applications for pass-
ports were delayed until investigations into the motives of the applicants could 
be completed. However, individuals who were not British subjects could apply 
at the consulates of their countries of origin for visas allegedly to return to 
Europe without any investigation.12 According to available information, many of 
the Hungarian volunteers chose this route to leave for Europe. In April, a new 
Foreign Enlistment Act was adopted which made it a criminal offense for any 
Canadian to enlist in the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any 
friendly state. On July 31, 1937 the act was applied to the enlistment by Cana-
dians on any side in Spain.13 Since it was illegal to volunteer for Spain, individ-
uals frequently disguised their identity under aliases, and recruitment in Canada 
was done in relative secrecy. 
When examining the motivations of the Canadian volunteers to leave for 
Spain, it is essential to recognize the impact of the Depression on their personal 
and collective experiences. Beginning in 1929-30, the collapse of the Canadian 
economy into chaos obliged many to travel across Canada and search for what 
little work was available. They had to compete with Canadian-born labourers for 
heavy physical work on the industrial frontiers which in previous years was left 
to recent immigrants. Some had worked in the relief camps the federal govern-
ment established for the unemployed or took part in the On-to-Ottawa Trek in 
1935 that led to confrontations with police and a number of casualties. 
The typical volunteer was politically radicalized by his experiences during 
the Depression and gravitated to left-wing organizations. In the Hungarian 
community, organizers from the Communist Party of the United States were sent 
to industrial centres in Canada to rccrait members.14 In many cases, it was only 
a question of t ime before they joined the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). 
Throughout the 1930s, left-wing associations allied with the CPC made a con-
certed effort to organize unemployed workers, especially recent immigrants.15 Of 
the Hungarian volunteers whose political affiliations are known, 26 belonged to 
the Communist Party of Canada. According to the Moscow records, the figure 
for all Canadian volunteers may be as high as 75%. 
The movement to recruit volunteers for Spain was administered by the 
Communist Party of Canada and there was a search for dedicated Communist 
Party members with previous military experience. Canada and the United States 
did not have compulsory military service in the 1920's and 1930's but many 
recent European immigrants arrived in Canada after completing their compulsory 
military service and therefore were preferred recruits. Among the Hungarian 
volunteers, information is available on only 7 with previous military experience 
and 4 of these served in the First World War. There was an attempt to recruit 
volunteers that were ideologically prepared and this required a record of some 
service in the Communist Party and the affiliated organizations.16 This accounts 
for the relatively high average age of the Canadian volunteers including those 
from the Hungarian community. The high average age of the Hungarian volun-
teers indicates that the decision to volunteer for Spain was made by men who 
were mature and, no doubt, aware of the consequences of their decision. 
Of the 55 Hungarian volunteers from Canada for whom a birthplace is 
given, 54 were born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that is, in Hungary. 
Approximately 75% of all Canadian volunteers were born outside of Canada. 
The year of immigration to Canada for 23 individuals is known; 21 had arrived 
during the years 1926-30 with the largest number (10) in 1929 when the 
Depression began in October. Two arrived in 1937 and shortly thereafter left for 
Spain. The known departure dates for 55 Hungarian volunteers indicate that 
almost all left for Spain in 1937, the large majority during the spring and 
summer months. The last two Hungarian volunteers arrived in Spain in February, 
1938. The new Foreign Enlistment Act may have encouraged some volunteers to 
leave before the implementation dates. On the basis of 50 individuals, the 
average age of the Hungarian volunteers in January, 1939 was 36.3; the Cana-
dian average was just over 33 years old. The iast known address of 73 volun-
teers was in urban and industrial centres with the largest numbers coming from 
Lethbridge (14), Toronto (12), Montreal (7), Windsor (6) and Drumhelier (4) and 
individual volunteers from various centres across Canada. This list of Canadian 
cities was generally similar to the last address of many of the other Canadian 
volunteers. The occupational backgrounds of 33 volunteers can be identified and 
portray a group of volunteers with solid working-class backgrounds. There were 
labourers (10), miners (6), farmers/labourers (5), mechanics (3), blacksmiths (3), 
and one each of the following: cook, waiter, cabinet-maker, shoemaker, moulder, 
engineer. 
Regardless of their ethnocultural origin, potential recruits were inter-
viewed by the Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. In Toronto, the Committee 
had its headquarters on Adelaide Street off Bay Street in the same building as 
the headquarters of the Communist Party of Canada. The Committee inter-
viewed the volunteers and attempted to exclude suspected RCMP agents and 
Trotskyites. When acccpted, the volunteers received a physical examination from 
a doctor, had to obtain travel documents and were given tickets.1 ' The Canadian 
law against foreign enlistment did have an influence on the need for secrecy and 
the time of departure. Many of the volunteers from Canada were sent by bus to 
New York City for embarkation to Europe. Individual volunteers crossed the 
border at Detroit and made their way to New York City. In other cases, they 
sailed from Montreal and Quebec City to avoid over-crowding the New York 
City facilities. A few volunteers left on their own initiative. The volunteers who 
travelled in organized groups usually landed in Lc Havre, France and made (heir 
way to Paris. Buses would lake them to the south of France and they illegally 
crossed the Pyrenees on foot under cover of darkness, led by guides. Not all 
volunteers crossed the Pyrenees successfully. A group of nine Canadian volun-
teers were intercepted by the French police in February, 1937. They were 
eventually released and continued on their way to Spain.18 In one case, arrange-
ments were made to have some of the volunteers leave France by ship, the 
Ciudad de Barcelona. This ship was torpedoed on May 29, 1937 and among the 
many casualties were two Hungarian volunteers from Canada. 
On the other side of the Pyrenees, the volunteers were met by representa-
tives of the International Brigades, taken to Barcelona and assigned to their units. 
If they spoke English, the volunteers were assigned to an English-language unit 
such as the Abraham Lincoln or the Mackenzic-Papincau Battalions. Otherwise 
they were assigned to their language-of-origin units. In the case of the Hungarian 
volunteers, many were directed to the Rakosi Battalion of the 13th International 
Brigade. They were trained in Casa Banes, a small village near Barcelona. Since 
most of the volunteers were expected to have some military experience, training 
was short. The Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion was one of the few units that 
received any form of organized military training for a period of three months. 
As the war progressed, the volunteers shared the fate of their respective 
units. Reports on their activities were included in the Daily Clarion and in the 
Kanadai Magyar Munkds. Some of those who were wounded were usually sent 
to other units such as rear support units or the artillery after recovery. An 
unspecified number of Canadian volunteers returned to Canada during 1937-1938 
due to wounds19 or 'of their own accord'. Among those who returned were at 
least 6 Hungarian volunteers. In September, 1938, the International Brigades 
including the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion were withdrawn from the front lines 
by the Republican government. It was hoped that this action would oblige the 
Franco forces to withdraw the German and Italian units fighting on their side. 
This did not prove to be the case. On October 28, 1938, the International 
Brigades marched through Barcelona in a memorable farewell parade. 
With the situation growing increasingly chaotic in the closing stages of 
the war, many Canadian volunteers were separated from their units; others 
deserted or simply disappeared.20 At least one Hungarian volunteer was listed as 
a deserter. At this time, those volunteers who were Party members were evalu-
ated according to iheir political activities and reports were prepared which were 
sent to the Communist Party of Canada. They were categorized as cadres: good, 
mediocre, bad and very bad. The standards were very high and the judgements 
were severe. The political work of volunteers during their term as prisoners-or-
war was also evaluated.21 in addition, non-Party members were evaluated 
according to their political activities and awareness. Some of the volunteers with 
distinguished records of service were recommended for Party work within the 
Hungarian community in Canada. For example, one report stated that "... 
Comrade Deza [sic Dezs6?j Beke No. 1 on your characteristics list is a very 
good Hungarian comrade and should be fully utilized in the work among the 
Hungarian People in Alberta... (from) Lethbridge, Hungarian. Very Good, Best 
among Hungarians, Speaks English fluently."22 Throughout the Spanish Civil 
War, the political attitudes of the volunteers were also closely monitored 
especially in the case of those who were CPC members. There was great 
suspicion of Trotskyites, anarchists and other political groups which were 
perceived as rivals. Inevitably, problems relating to administration and military 
discipline were interpreted in political terms. Complete adherence to the 
Communist Party position on events in Spain was expected and demanded. After 
demobilization, volunteers were sought to defend Barcelona but two of the 
Hungarian volunteers turned in their CPC cards rather than volunteer.23 
In December-January, 1939, the volunteers crossed the Pyrenees into 
France along with the Republican Spanish refugees. They were confined in 
internment camps in Gurs in southern France and awaited repatriation.24 In this 
manner, many volunteers who served in other units joined the Canadian volun-
teers who had served in the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion and thereby became 
collectively known as 'the Mac-Paps' . 
The Canadian volunteers were interviewed by Canadian immigration 
officials and placed into one of three categories: Canadian citizens by birth, 
Canadian citizens (British born or naturalized in Canada) and aliens (those who 
claimed to have been legally landed and resided in Canada for five years or 
more). The volunteers with passports, Canadian birth certificates and naturaliza-
tion papers were readily readmitted to Canada.2^ Those who were aliens had to 
prove that they had resided in Canada for at least five years. Two Hungarian 
volunteers were refused re-admission to Canada because they did not have at 
least five years of residency in Canada.26 
The volunteers who were allowed to return to Canada travelled through 
England to Halifax and then by train to Toronto where they were greeted with a 
large parade on February 5, 1939 at the Toronto railway station. They then 
dispersed across Canada to their own communities and attempted to reestablish 
their lives. Some remained active in the Communist Party of Canada and various 
other left-wing organizations while others apparently abandoned political activity 
and "disappeared" into the anonymity of everyday life. Two Hungarians from 
Canada remained in Spain as prisoncrs-of-war and were released only in 1941 
and 1942. Of the 74 men whose fate is known, 53 eventually left Spain, inclu-
ding 3 who had been taken prisoners-of-war; 14 were killed in action, 4 declared 
missing in Spain including 2 as prisoners-of-war. 
During the Second World War, some of the Canadian volunteers claimed 
that they attempted to enrol in the Canadian armed forces but they were rejected 
because of their service in Spain. When the Communist Party of Canada was 
banned by the federal government in the summer or 1940, the leadership was 
arrested and interned. However, after the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June, 1941, attitudes in some federal government departments changed 
towards the members of the Communist Party. In 1943 there were attempts by 
the Special Operations Executive, a British military organization, to recruit 
Spanish Civil War veterans in Canada for special operations in central Europe 
and the Balkans. At least two Hungarian veterans were contacted for possible 
service in Hungary.28 
An association of all Canadian veterans was formed in September, 1938,29 
and over the years held regular meetings and reunions. The veterans maintained 
an active interest in Spanish events and organized protests when possible to 
assist Spanish refugees and political prisoners.30 One of the main objectives of 
their association was the attempt to gain official recognition from the Canadian 
government. The onset of the Second World War and especially the Cold War 
placed the events and the participants of the Spanish Civil War in a different and 
changing context. Among those Hungarian volunteers who returned to Canada, 
the establishment of a Communist regime in Hungary encouraged many to return 
to Hungary. After the Second World War, 14 veterans returned to Hungary and 
one went to live in the Soviet Union.11 
After the death of Francisco Franco and the democratization of the 
Spanish government, a group of Canadian veterans organized a tour to Spain in 
August-September, 1979 to revisit their old battlegrounds. There were other 
visits on various anniversaries and for special events.32 Recently, their campaign 
for official recognition resulted in some success. On June 4, 1995, Canada's 
National Historic Sites and Monuments Board erected a plaque in honour of the 
Mackenzie-Papineau volunteers at Queen 's Park in Toronto.'3 However, a 
motion in the House of Commons on May 25, 1998 to obtain veteran status for 
the surviving Mac-Pap veterans was defeated.'4 
The motivations of the Hungarian Canadian volunteers to enrol in the 
International Brigades were largely based on their experiences in the labour 
movement in Canada and their subsequent political radicalization during the 
Depression of the early 1930s. For some volunteers, the events in Europe with 
the rise of Nazi Germany were the main reason for their political activities and 
their departure for Spain. In almost every case, their reasons for volunteering for 
Spain was due to their opposition to fascism. 
Their political involvement in the Canadian left-wing movement of the 
1930's was due to the existence of a number of associations and organizations 
that eagerly sought their membership and participation. The Hungarian commu-
nity in Canada was characterized by a polarization along political lines into leit-
and right-wing organizations. The membership of the left-wing organizations 
grew to protest the economic conditions of Depression. Their formal and in-
formal networks provided a motivated and organized body of ready recruits 
when volunteers were sought for Spain. Some went to Spain to test the courage 
of their own political convictions. Others who were CPC members, were sent by 
the CPC to Spain to be tested and hardened. The experience strengthened the 
political beliefs and convictions of some and shattered the political careers of 
others. During the Spanish Civil War and after, these organizations provided the 
volunteers and the returned veterans with encouragement and support. The 
volunteers who remained active in the Canadian left-wing organizations, were 
held in high esteem and respected throughout their lives as veterans of the 
International Brigades and as representatives of the epic ideological struggles of 
the 1930s. 
These veterans also represented a cross-section of the hundreds of 
thousands of Canadians and recent immigrants who felt the full impact of the 
Depression during the 1930s in Canada and who were fully aware of the threat 
of fascism in Europe. The friendships which were forged and the commitments 
made during the Depression and especially during their service in the Interna-
tional Brigades, endured for many decades providing a core of dedicated 
members and leaders in the Canadian left-wing movement. 
Many continued to fight the ideological battles from this period and their 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War remained the defining experience of their 
lives. As a result, many of the myths and legends surrounding the role of the 
International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War continue to be mixed with 
serious academic research on this subject. The contributions of the Canadian 
volunteers remain largely unknown in Canadian historiography and the specific 
Hungarian participation rarely receives any mention in Hungarian Canadian 
literature and studies. With the end of the Cold War, the opening of the 
Moscow archives and the RCMP surveillance records, it is now possible to re-
examine from a historical perspective the participation of Canadians in the 
Spanish Civil War and dispel some of the myths and legends that have character-
ized this episode in Canadian history. 
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cants for passports to travel to Europe in The Winnipeg Free Press, 15 January, 1937; 
Ottawa Citizen. 20 February, 1937; and Regina Leader, 14 January, 1937. 
13. For further information on the Foreign Enlistment Act, see Thor Eirik Frohn-
Nielsen, Canada's Foreign Enlistment Act: Mackenzie King's Expedient Response to the 
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Appendix 
Nominal List of Hungarian Volunteers 
Alarm (rH) 
Balogh, Mihaly 
Bartus, Ignac (rH) 
Beke, Daniel (Dezso) (rH) 
Bcrthus, Paul (rH) 
Bodnar, Walter 
Bogncr, Julius 
Bollo, Joseph 
Borics, Joseph (KIA) 
Brunner, Emeric 
Bubanecz, John 
Buckovic, Michael (POW) 
Chodur, Michael (KIA) 
Cisko, Andrew 
Cseriszuyes, Sandor 
Cscrny, Joseph (KIA) 
Csirmaz, Mihaly 
Csokc, Andrew (MIA) 
Erdei, Gabor 
Farkas, Alexander 
Farkas, Ferenc 
Fercnez, John (KIA) 
Filkohazi, Emeric (KIA) 
Gal, John (rH) 
Gilian, Andrew (KIA) 
Combos, Anthony (SU) 
Gyuricza, Matyas (rH) 
Hadaszi, Karoly (KIA) 
Herter, Adam (rH) 
Horwath, Vendal (rH) 
Illes, Paul (POW/MIA) 
Jaczku, Istvan 
Jcncy, Gabor (KIA) 
Jokvach, Joseph 
Juhas, Alexander (rH) 
Kasza, John 
Koleszal, Geza 
Kondas, George 
Koradi, Alex 
Kosma, Denis 
Kovacs, Istvan 
Krizan, Joseph 
Krizan, Antal (KIA) 
Magyar, Joseph 
Medgyse, Karoly (POW) 
Merges, Elmer 
Mezei, Elmer 
Michna, Mihaly (KIA) 
Milas, Nikola 
Mocik, Istvan (KIA) 
Molnar, James Imre 
Mozer, Joseph 
from Canada in the International Brigades 
Nadanicek, Janos 
Ordog, Frank 
Osirmaz, Mihaly 
Pacsuta, Gyorgy 
Pocik, Stener 
Pretz, Adam (KIA) 
Princze, Joseph (MIA) 
Racz, Imre (KIA) 
Ragvacs, Janos (KIA) 
Rajki, Mathias 
Ribas 
Satiz, Joseph 
Schmelt/.er, George 
Schmidt, Joseph 
Schneider, John 
Sirko, Louis 
Sisco, Alexander (MIA) 
Soltesz, Joseph (rH) 
Steiner, Sandor 
Straus, Gyorgy (rH) 
Szabari, Gabriel 
Szabo, John 
Syurkovics, Istvan 
Szucsko, Paul (POW) 
Takacs, George (rH) 
Tomasi. Michael (rH) 
Toth, Dezso 
Toth, George 
Tuz, Imre 
Varga, Andrew 
Varga, George 
Varro, Fcrencz (rH) 
Vasas, Zoltan (POW/MIA) 
Vitez, Imre 
Explanation of abbreviations in 
the parentheses: 
KIA Killed in Action 
MIA Missing in Action 
POW Prisoner of War 
rH Returned to Hungary 
SU Relocated to the Soviet Union 
Note: The names here are repro-
duced as they had appeared in the 
original document, i.e. without dia-
critical marks. 
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The Soviet-Yugoslav Detente, 
Belgrade-Budapest Relations, 
and the Hungarian Revolution (1955-56)1 
Johanna Granville 
Just over four decades ago the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern 
Europe — the revolution in Hungary — took place. Most scholars have focused 
on Soviet-Hungarian relations to discern causes of the conflict,2 while under-
emphasizing the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in 
the months preceding the Hungarian revolt and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role 
in the conflict/ Many have assumed that oncc Soviet-Yugoslav relations were 
"normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other 
"peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of 
Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium 
meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and 
motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and information-
providers, and on the events of 1956 generally.4 The article will explain that the 
Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous, 
particularly between May 1955 and February 1956.'' Having initiated the rift 
with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in 
Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily 
induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own 
trip to Belgrade in May 1955. As explained below, this foot-dragging by the 
Hungarian dictator Matyas Rakosi (the most obsequious "Stalinist" to exit the 
stage) and the lingering bitterness of Tito and his subordinates confused the 
Soviet leaders somewhat about the true causes of the Hungarian revolt.6 The 
"Nagy affair," which developed in the two weeks following the Soviet invasion, 
chilled relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc nations once again.7 
Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations after July, 1955 
The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was 
first set in motion when Khrushchev took the initiative to visit Tito in Belgrade 
in July 1955. At first the rapprochement looked as if it would continue uninter-
rupted, and that all the bloc members — including Rakosi's Hungary — would 
play their part. In addition to Khrushchev's Belgrade trip and the disbandment of 
the Cominform,* Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in February 1956 further paved the way toward 
warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged 
the existence of "many national roads to socialism" and foresaw "peaceful 
transitions to communism" for capitalist and colonial states alike. He also 
claimed that war between capitalist and communist systems was no longer 
"fatalistically inevitable," despite Lenin's prediction that war would continue 
indefinitely between the two camps. In the closed session (the "Secret Speech"), 
on February 24-25, 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with 
Yugoslavia had been an "unnecessary" and "shameful" mistake." 
The speech, with its denunciation of Joseph Stalin's brutality, "cult of 
personality," and acute paranoia, clearly delighted Tito, who received a copy of 
the secrct text and published it in the Yugoslav party paper Borba [Struggle] on 
March 20, 1956. In Tito's mind, the decisions of the Twentieth Congress were 
merely the "continuation of a new trend within communist parties that began in 
Yugoslavia."10 Moreover, Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with the 
West fit niccly with Tito's own ideas about "the principles of coexistence" and 
the evil of separate blocs and spheres of influence. These principles — Tito told 
the student body at Rangoon University (Burma) in January 1955 — arc the only 
way to resolve international political conflicts. Furthermore, the division of the 
world into spheres of influence and blocs, Tito told the Indian Parliament in 
December 1954, is "one of the four basic elements which lie at the root of so 
much evil." Countries and states with different systems will not disappear 
overnight, Tito said, and thus cocxistence is not only possible but necessary if a 
new world war is to be avoided." 
Khrushchev's rhetoric about "peaceful coexistence" between the two 
socioeconomic systems also helped Tito rationalize his acceptance of economic 
aid f rom both the Soviet bloc and the United States. From Tito's break with 
Moscow in 1948 until 1956, the United States provided an estimated $1 billion 
in military and economic aid to Yugoslavia. 
After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, which launched the process 
of normalization, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to exact 
reparations from Soviet bloc countries without jeopardizing the aid from the 
United States, The 1948 rift — when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comin 
form and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc — had caused great 
economic disruption, and Tito wanted to make sure his country would be com-
pensated for damages. Most communist bloc countries complied, but Hungary 
was reluctant.13 The Soviet Union agreed to help Yugoslavia by extending $250 
million in economic credit14 and by developing Yugoslavia's atomic energy 
program.15 Czechoslovakia agreed to pay $50 million in reparations over a ten-
year period at a 2 percent interest rate.16 Romania permitted several thousand 
Serbian prisoners to return to the Banat region.17 According to Stuart H. Van 
Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administra-
tion in 1956, the Soviet bloc as a whole made nearly $300 million of easy credit 
available to Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslav relations with Hungary, however, remained at an impasse. 
Several problems persisted — the most obvious one being the fact that Tito 
detested Rakosi, the Hungarian leader — "the Last Mohican of the Stalinist Era" 
and "Stalin's Best Disciple" — who had clung to power long after the deaths of 
the other Stalinist leaders in the East European countries.18 Rakosi had con-
ducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other communist 
party leaders in the "peoples' democracies."19 Thousands of Hungarian commu-
nist officials and intellectuals were sentenced to death or years of imprisonment, 
while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party — and an 
even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, to prisons or to 
concentration camps. Among the victims were Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk and 
other prominent figures of the country's communist leadership.20 Most of them 
had been accused of being agents for Tito, the "chained dog of Western imperi-
alists." As Tito exclaimed in a speech in 1949: "[Olver there, in Hungary, the 
leaders are the most corrupted souls, the biggest perverts!"21 Later, in the 
summer of 1956, Tito described his enemy to the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki: "I 
know Rakosi; he's an insensitive, merciless, stubborn, and heartless person." 
Kurimszki noted that Tito "gripped the edge of the table" as he spoke.22 
Because Rakosi had played such a prominent role in denouncing Tito, the 
process of normalizing Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in 1955-56 entailed a direct 
threat to his own power and legitimacy. Rakosi clung to power as long as he 
could by resorting to half-measures. He expressed his regret for the rupture in 
Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in 1948, but blamed a conveniently dead Lavrenti 
Beria.23 However, Tito insisted in 1955 that several issues had to be resolved 
before Yugoslav relations with Hungary could be normalized: for example, the 
rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in 
Hungary,24 fair treatment of the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary,25 and the 
payment of reparations to Yugoslavia. 
Rajk was eventually rehabilitated on March 28 and honorably reburied on 
October 6, 1956. However, in his announcement of the rehabilitation — pub-
lished in Szabad Nep on March 29 — Rakosi never actually accepted full 
responsibility for Rajk's death. He blamed everyone from Beria, Victor Abaku-
mov,26 Mihaly Farkas,27 and Gabor Peter2S instead.29 On May 18 Rakosi admitted 
a degree of responsibility for the mass repression in the 1949-1952 period, 
although not for the Rajk case. 
After some procrastination, Rakosi also freed all the Yugoslav prisoners 
in Hungary (197 people). On December 9, 1955, the Rakosi government allowed 
them either to return to Yugoslavia or remain in Hungary.30 (Rakosi had haras -
sed the Yugoslavs living in Hungary, arresting many of them,11 soon after the 
Rajk trial in 1949.) 
As for the Hungarians' treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, 
the situation also improved somewhat, once travel restrictions on Yugoslav 
diplomats and journalists •— the information-providers — were removed/ 2 After 
1948, all schools in Hungary offering instruction in Serbo-Croatian had appar-
ently been shut down, particularly in the town of Mohacs in southern Hungary. 
Yugoslav children in Hungary were thus forced to learn the Magyar tongue. By 
1956 only several hundred Yugoslavs in Mohacs even remembered their native 
tongue. This situation was little known because Yugoslav diplomats were 
apparently unable to visit the town, which had become part of a "forbidden 
border zone" after the Tito-Stalin schism.33 Rumours also abounded that in the 
late fall of 1955 the Hungarian authorities had arrested a large number of Serbs 
living in southern Hungary.34 Once the so-called forbidden zone was opened in 
early 1956, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists made a point of attending 
cultural events there, and of denouncing Rakosi's "policy of magyarization," a 
practice which irritated Hungarian and Soviet officials no end, judging from 
these officials' documented conversations. The war of words was often very 
bitter. At one point Yugoslav attache Radenovic apparently accused the Hunga-
rians of treating the arrested Yugoslavs the way Italian fascist authorities had 
treated Yugoslav partizans during World War II for the latters' violence against 
suspectcd Nazi collaborators.35 We should note, of course, that Tito himself had 
been responsible for the presence of many Yugoslavs in Hungary as he had 
forced thousands of Yugoslav citizens loyal to the Cominform (branded "Stalin-
ists," "Cominformists," or iheovci)36 to flee their country after the 1948 schism.37 
(The less fortunate iheovci were sent to the infamous "Goli Otok" concentration 
camp in Yugoslavia.) According to Belgrade sources, the entire Cominformist 
emigration amounted to 4,928 individuals.38 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of the most persistent sources of 
tension between the two countries was the issue of financial reparations, the 
negotiations on which repeatedly stalled, unlike the negotiations with the other 
bloc members. Tito wanted not only to be compensated for the ruptured trade 
ties with Hungary, but also to be repaid for the economic credits Yugoslavia had 
extended to Hungary between 1946 and 1948.19 Delegates from the two coun-
tries first met on September 7, but the talks ended in a stalemate on September 
24, 1955.40 Another round of secret negotiations began on January 17, 1956.41 
The Yugoslavs insisted on a sum of $150 million, to be paid in the course of 
seven years, while the Hungarians would not budge from their offer of $71-72 
million worth of commodities over a period of 10 years.42 Again, the negotia-
tions broke down. In mid-March the Hungarian Politburo decided to increase the 
proposed sum by $10 million.43 Talks resumed on April 19, 1956, and on May 
29, 1956, a draft agreement on reparations was reached.44 By June 26, Rakosi 
was able to report to Voroshilov in Moscow that "mutual financial claims 
fpretenziia] with Yugoslavia have been completely resolved." Rakosi confided in 
Voroshilov, however, that the Yugoslav delegation behaved so "arrogantly," that 
he had to keep his fellow Hungarians from reciprocating, in order to prevent the 
talks from breaking down yet again.45 The Yugoslav negotiators' attitudes — if 
we can trust Rakosi's report — indicate their feelings toward the Hungarian 
leaders, while Rakosi's report seems illustrative of the resentment he continued to 
feel toward the regime in Belgrade. 
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the rehabilitation of 
Laszlo Rajk, the amnesty granted to Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, 
improved treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, and the agreement 
about reparations payment, were apparently not enough to ensure good relations 
between Budapest and Belgrade. This fact underlines the failure of Khrushchev's 
"pilgrimage" to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 
1956 to bring lasting improvement to intra-bloc relations through eliminating — 
or, at least, greatly reducing — the mutual distrust that had existed between the 
Yugoslav and Hungarian leaderships ever since 1948. 
Conflicting Views of Developments in Hungary 
Khrushchev and his associates apparently assumed that "destalinizalion" in 
Hungary could take place as soon as new leaders were installed in the peoples' 
democracies. In Hungary Rakosi was at long last replaced in July as the Party's 
First Secretary with Erno Gero. However, the destalinizalion policy unleashed 
forces beyond Khrushchev's power to control. A number of authors have clearly 
showed that Moscow had been unprepared for the Hungarian crisis.46 Soviet 
leaders were unable to defuse the situation as they had in the case of Poland.4' 
The changes they made were always too late, outpaced by the wave of popular 
unrest. The masses themselves — not just the party elite or intelligentsia — were 
dissatisfied. The Soviet leaders mistakenly believed that by putting pressure on 
Tito, the popular movement in Hungary could be stopped.48 To understand 
better why and how the Soviet leaders miscalculated — and why the Hungarian-
Yugoslav rapprochement was so slow — we must assess the nature of the 
information upon which Soviet leaders' perceptions were based. 
The reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest were often biased and 
alarmist. The embassy's staff construed the Yugoslav representatives' eagerness 
to strengthen ties with the Hungarians as interference in Hungary's internal 
affairs and a threat to the USSR.49 At the same time the Yugoslavs perceived 
the Hungarians' tardiness in responding to Tito's stated preconditions for normal-
ization as evidence of their unwillingness to admit their mistakes committed in 
the 1949-1952 period. 
Why were the reports by information providers not more objective? 
Perhaps it would be useful to consider the actual motivations of these people in 
order to answer this question. Although Khrushchev had, after much delay, 
replaced Rakosi with Gero (and eventually with Imre Nagy and then Janos 
Kadar), mid-level state and diplomatic officials in Hungary (just as in Yugosla-
via and the USSR) — that is, the people actually in charge of the day-to-day 
running of diplomatic relations — remained at their posts.50 These were officials 
whose attitudes had been most shaped by the events of 1948-49, and who could 
not easily abandon their resentments. 
Indeed, mid-level diplomats and journalists —- whether in Hungary, 
Yugoslavia or the USSR — played an important role in the events of 1955-56, 
but their perspectives often differed from those of their superiors (i.e., the state 
and party leaders). The archives reveal a steady stream of negative diplomatic 
reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest to the Central Committee of the 
Soviet Presidium or the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Although he had lost 
credibility after July 1956, Rakosi also sent letters to the CPSU Central Commit-
tee — by this time from his residence in the Soviet Union — warning that 
"Hungarians [were] lavishing attention on Yugoslavia."51 Some of these reports, 
as well as those of the Soviet diplomats, contained unconfirmed rumours. Those 
filed by Yugoslav diplomats were no different. Tito himself complaincd about 
the "disinformation from our diplomatic personnel" during the secret meeting in 
the Crimea in late September 1956.v The dissemination of this kind of disinfor-
mation had helped to prevent full reconciliation between Hungary and Yugosla-
via, and between Yugoslavia and the USSR. 
Perhaps it would be useful to consider the motivations of these three 
groups of information-providers: the hard-line pro-Soviet Hungarian officials, the 
Soviet diplomats in Budapest, and the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists. 
The pro-Soviet Hungarian officials were inclined to give alarmist reports 
to the Soviet diplomats at the Budapest embassy, because it was they who felt 
most threatened by the rising popular discontent. Their jobs depended on Soviet 
power propping up the regime. They knew only too well that they — branded 
"Muscovites" and "Stalinists" — were hated even more than Soviet diplomatic 
and military personnel, because they were Magyars betraying fellow Magyars. 
Thus, they had a tendency to exaggerate the "danger" and to report every real or 
perceived rebuff (from the Yugoslavs) to the Soviet embassy personnel, in the 
hope that the Russians would take strong action. These alarmist reports, they 
hoped, served to "prove" their loyalty to Moscow,53 
The Soviet diplomats in Budapest also felt threatened by the rising 
discontent long suppressed during the Stalin era. The fact that they were in a 
foreign country for protracted periods of time made them suspect to the Kremlin 
leaders. Indeed, only a very few members of the Soviet elite were ever trusted to 
be sent abroad. Once given such an assignment, Soviet diplomats were con-
stantly aware of the need to prove they had not "gone native." This way of 
thinking is revealed in their characterization of other diplomats. For example, in 
a collectively written biographical reference (spravka), Soviet diplomats de-
scribed both Ferenc Miinnich,54 and Lajos CsebP5 to be partial to Yugoslavia, 
simply because both Hungarian officials had once served as ambassadors to 
Yugoslavia. This tendency of the Soviet diplomats to take a hard-line position in 
order to prove their loyalty to Moscow probably became even more intense when 
they were stationed in a country that was perceived to be in rebellion against the 
Soviet Union. The fact that an "anti-Soviet movement" was growing in Hungary 
increased the danger that they, the diplomats, would be deemed, at the least, as 
not having been "strict" or "vigilant" enough, or at the most, as having encour-
aged anti-Soviet feelings. Being especially "vigilant," however, could improve 
one's chances for promotion in the Soviet hierarchy. It is noteworthy, for 
example, that Ambassador Yuri Andropov, who took a very strict approach to 
the 1956 revolution, was promoted in 1957 to the post of director of the CPSU 
Central Committee's department for ties with communist parties in the Soviet 
bloc.56 Janos Kadar's government also presented him with a special award.57 
Clearly, Andropov's "vigilance" was richly rewarded. 
Both Soviet diplomats and the Hungarian loyalists, described earlier, 
believed that "interference in Hungary's internal affairs" in the period before 
mid-October included the Yugoslavs visiting factories and preaching "the 
Yugoslav way" to the workers there, as well as publishing long articles about 
Imre Nagy's activities in major Yugoslav newspapers while abridging or virtually 
ignoring the speeches of Gero. For these Soviet and Hungarian information-
providers, the Yugoslavs' support of Nagy was especially vexing, since Nagy had 
not even been readmitted to the communist party until October 14, 1956. 
To some extent the Soviet and Hungarian officials were correct: the 
Yugoslavs were interfering in Hungary's internal affairs. According to interna-
tional law, a diplomatic envoy should remain politically neutral and not become 
involved in the local politics of the host country. But at times these officials 
appear to have confused "interference in the internal affairs" of Hungary with 
freedom of the Yugoslav press. They complained that the Yugoslav newspapers, 
especially the major ones, like Borba and Politika, were giving excessive 
coverage to the "counterrevolutionary events" in Hungary, while virtually 
ignoring major events in the USSR or in the People's Republic of China. These 
critics tended to forget that it was the Yugoslav journalists' professional duty to 
collect as much information as possible, especially about a country on their own 
border. By merely reporting, these journalists did not violate the sovereignty of 
Hungary. Accusations of interference by Yugoslavia bccamc especially ludicrous 
after the November 4 invasion. Who were the Russians — who sent tanks 
crashing into Budapest —- to talk about "interference in the internal affairs of 
Hungary?"5* Perhaps the reason why the proliferation of Titoist ideas so 
exasperated both Hungarian and Soviet officials is that they could not openly 
protest this influence: Khrushchev had publicly "made up" with Tito, so the 
latter had been certified respectable again. 
For many Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the 1948-1949 events in 
Hungary had been formative experiences in their carecrs. Well-acquainted with 
the hardships Yugoslavia's population had endured as a result of the humiliating 
dismissal from the Cominform and economic boycott by the Soviet bloc coun-
tries, it was hard for some of them to change their thinking about Rakosi and his 
Stalinist colleagues. Like Tito, they were pleased with Khrushchev's speeches at 
the Twentieth Party Congress, which they considered "a qualitative leap," but 
they expected much more direct criticism of Stalin at future party congresses.59 
Their hatred of Rakosi only intensified after he admitted in March 1956 that 
Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited their own colleague Lazar 
Brankov. In 1948 Rakosi had ignored Brankov's diplomatic immunity, arrested 
him and got him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 
trial.60 (Brankov had been consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest at the 
time and was charge d'affaires in the absence of Ambassador Mrazovic.)61 
The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that 
many of the Yugoslav diplomats had "built their careers on" the 1948 rift and 
now had difficulty readjusting/" For example, Marko Zsigmond, second secre-
tary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus "knew the history of the 
Soviet-Yugoslav rift well."63 Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency 
to harp on the 1948 events in conversations.64 
For many Yugoslav diplomats the temptation to say "I told you so" was 
overwhelming. Many had traveled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and 
cultural events put on by the Yugoslavs, telling Hungarian workers that the 1948 
rift had been the "Stalinists' fault." After the verbal abuse they had endured just 
a few years earlier, they must have been tempted to gloat over Rakosi's setbacks 
and boast about Yugoslavia's accomplishments. The ultimate repercussions of 
their encouragement of lmre Nagy's supporters do not seem to have troubled 
(hem. For them the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so 
slow was simple: it was all Rakosi's fault. Many Yugoslav journalists attended 
the Petofi Club's discussions,65 and attributed the complaints by the students and 
writers to the fact that Rakosi had not fully recanted his mistakes.66 For these 
Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the measure of Khrushchev's sincerity was 
his willingness to whip Rakosi into line or to dismiss him. 
The Yugoslav diplomats also spread the rhetoric about the "third camp" 
and how there could be "alternative roads to socialism," which was in some 
ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin's 
"popular front from above" and Tito's "popular front from below." In contrast to 
Soviet and Hungarian officials' claims of excessive coverage of the Hungarian 
"counterrevolution" in the Yugoslav media, the Yugoslav journalists complained 
about the scanty coverage of Yugoslav events and speeches by Yugoslav 
officials in Hungarian newspapers. Several speeches, they claimed, were "printed 
in such an abridged form that the information was distorted," while unimportant 
events in the other socialist countries were covered extensively.6' 
It should be noted that the Yugoslavs were not the only proselytizers. 
Some of the attempts to improve ties (especially at the non-governmental level) 
between the two East European countries came at the initiative of the anti-
Stalinist (or even anti-Soviet) Hungarian intellectuals themselves. As an anec-
dotal example, the Hungarians wanted to resurrect the Hungarian-Yugoslav 
cultural society, which had been banned in 1949.68 Ambassador Andropov 
immediately notified Moscow with alarm. "Pay attention to the fact that, despite 
the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the 
enclosed document shows," he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian 
intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against accusations of 
"interference." As Tito wrote in one of his post-invasion letters to the CPSU, in 
essence: it is not Yugoslavia's fault if Hungarians look to Yugoslavia as a model 
to emulate.69 
Tito's Attitudes 
Tito's own perspectives serve as further explanation why initiatives like Khrush-
chev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June 
1956 did not quickly dispel the mistrust between the Yugoslavs and Hungarians. 
To Tito destalinization entailed much more than simply the replacement of 
Stalinist leaders with national communists in the East European communist 
countries, or simply the resolution of the concrete issues outlined above — 
although all these matters were important to him. Rather, Tito sought a funda-
mental recognition that Yugoslavia was just as important as the Soviet Union in 
the international communist movement. Thus, while in many respects, Tito's 
individual perspective resembled that of the Yugoslav information-providers, the 
slowness of the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement stemmed also from Tito's 
own memories and values. His vivid recollection of Rakosi's ruthless anti-Tito 
campaign, beginning with the Rajk trial in 1949, made it difficult for Tito to 
forgive and forget. 
Furthermore, Tito greatly valued Yugoslavia's unique brand of national 
communism which had emerged from Yugoslav soil and the experiences of 
World War IT. From Tito's perspective, Yugoslavia's historical achievements 
were hard-earned and thus needed to be cherished. It was the "twofold character 
of the National Liberation Struggle" — against both fascist aggressors and 
internal traitors — that made Yugoslavia unique. In an article written in Octobcr 
1946, Tito had written: 
ITJhc people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders 
but also against their allies, the local traitors — the gangs of Pavelic, 
Nedic, Rupnik, and Draza Mihailovic. Despite the fact that the invaders 
and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in their great 
struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation struggle of the 
nations of Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No other occupied 
country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and our people have a 
right to be proud of it.70 
It should also be kept in mind that Tito's Partisans had defeated the Nazi 
occupiers without the help of the Soviet Red army. True, Stalin sent security 
guards for Tito, but this was after the war and intended more as a means of 
Soviet control than of protection for Yugoslavia." Then, in June 1948, Stalin 
banished Tito from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), just nine 
months after its founding congress in Szklarska Poreba (Poland). The Cominform 
resolution calling for Yugoslavia's expulsion accused the country of "pursuing an 
incorrect line" in foreign policy, representing a "departure from Marxism-
Leninism." It also stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party had spread "slan-
derous propaganda about the "degeneration of the CPSU," thus borrowing "from 
the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism."72 At the heart of the Soviet-
Yugoslav dispute was Tito's refusal to obey Stalin. Stalin first became angry at 
Tito already during the final phases of the war for supporting the Greek commu-
nists as well as for claiming the city of Trieste, thus complicating Stalin's 
wartime alliance with the British and Americans.73 When all the communist bloc 
countries broke off trade with Yugoslavia, Tito's Communist party managed to 
stay in power, despite the sudden economic boycott. To the Soviet leaders' 
dismay, Tito succcedcd in receiving economic and military assistance from the 
Americans while still remaining communist. Both Tito and his representatives in 
Budapest were fond of reminding Hungarian and Soviet officials of the fact that 
they had not "surrendered to the imperialists," despite their ostracism from the 
socialist camp.74 Tito ccrtainly had not disappeared when Stalin had "shaken his 
little finger."7> Indeed the Stalin-Tito feud was so intense that Tito expected the 
Russians to intervene while the West was distracted by the war in Korea.76 
Stalin may also have authorized an assassination of Tito in (he fall of 1952, 
which was aborted only bccause of Stalin's own unexpected death in March 
1953.77 Having fought and won independence from both the Nazis (militarily) 
and from the Russians (economically and ideologically), Tito vowed never to 
relinquish Yugoslavia's new status, never to capitulate to Moscow. 
Tito's peddling of the third-path model evidently worried Soviet and 
Hungarian officials for both ideological and political reasons. The concept 
frightened Moscow because it was providing communists with an ideological 
sanction for disobedience. Even after the disbanding of the Cominform in 1956, 
the Soviet leaders insisted that their Party should play a leading role in the world 
communist movement. (One of the "twenty-one conditions" for admission of a 
communist party to the Comintern, one might recall, had been rigid allegiance to 
the Bolshevik party line in Moscow.) As Khrushchev explained to Tito, appar-
ently in earnest: "we didn't seek a leading role; historical conditions have given 
us this special responsibility, and now we need to fulfill it."78 
In the context of politics, Tito's advocacy of a "third path" bespoke 
possible intentions to form a separate alliance between Yugoslavia and some of 
the other communist countries, excluding the Soviet Union — a new regional 
federation of states, this time including Hungary.79 The notion of intrabloc ties 
independent of Moscow repelled Soviet leaders — and the Hungarian leaders 
dependent on Soviet hegemony — becausc it reminded them of the Titoist threat 
back in the mid-1940s, when Tito strove to form independent ties with other 
East European countries without Moscow's participation. Tito's Balkan Pact with 
Grccce and Turkey, established in 1954, was bad enough. Having ties with these 
two countries was tantamount to joining NATO, the Soviet leaders felt.80 But 
an alliance of communist countries, or small countries with sizable communist 
parties, that excluded the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. To the Soviets 
Tito seemed intent on forming one, or at the very least, driving a wedge between 
the USSR and the other bloc countries.81 They could not understand the concept 
of neutralism; any alliance excluding them would ipso facto be an anti-Soviet 
alliance. 
Even if a separate bloc or federation were not formed, what the Soviet 
authorities and Hungarian Stalinists feared was the "spillover effect," or ideologi-
cal contamination of the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media.82 As 
mentioned earlier, the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists to 
some extent caused the Soviet leaders to misinterpret the origins of the discon-
tent in Hungary. The Soviet leaders tended to think that only a small coterie of 
writers and intellectuals was causing the trouble, not the "toiling masses" of 
Hungary. This mentality was especially true of Soviet party stalwart Mikhail 
Suslov, w7ho was sent to Budapest in mid-June 1956, and wrote back to Moscow, 
assuring the Kremlin that "...the mood of the workers and peasants is healthy.... 
[AJmong them, as well as in the lower industrial parly organizations, there are 
no conversations about a 'crisis' in the party leadership or about distrust toward 
the leaders."83 
Meanwhile Moscow also received numerous reports from Andropov, 
Gero, and others, complaining about Yugoslav influence on the Hungarian 
intelligentsia.84 Thus the Soviet and Hungarian leaders tried several times in the 
months preceding the crisis to get Tito to exert pressure on his diplomats and 
journalists. For example, when the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki visited Tito at 
his retreat on Brioni Island on July 21, 1956 to deliver the official note about 
Rakosi's resignation, he also "reminded Tito about the commentaries on the 
Yugoslav radio and articles that appeared in the newspapers Borba and Poli-
tika.... [Hie compared the roles of Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos with the 
activities of Milovan Djilas."85 Tito evidently ignored him.86 The issue was 
raised again, both when CPSU Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan visited Tito 
on the same day,8' and also when Khaishchev, Tito, Gero, Kadar and others 
convened in the Crimea (Yalta) in September-October, 1956.88 (Earlier, on 
September 3, the CPSU had warned all the East European communist parties in 
a secret letter not to "take the Yugoslav example" too seriously; the purpose of 
the Crimea meeting was, in part, for Khrushchev and Tito to iron out their 
differences). "The Yugoslav mission in Budapest openly maintains ties with 
people in opposition to the CC HWP,,. [and] the Yugoslav newspapers shield the 
opportunists banished from the communist party... for example, Imre Nagy in 
Hungary,"89 Khrushchev claimed. 
The Soviet leaders believed the Hungarian intellectuals were being 
"infected" by the Yugoslavs.90 If only Tito would clamp down on them, they 
thought, the situation in Hungary would calm down. It is significant that during 
the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting, according to the recently declass-
ified Malin notes, Khrushchev thought he could use the Yugoslavs' influence on 
Hungary to Soviet advantage. He asked his colleagues: Would it not be approp-
riate if the Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians?91 Moreover, during this same 
meeting, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov acknowledged 
that "the influence of the [Hungarian Communist] party on the masses [was] 
weak," despite the initial reassuring messages from Comrades Mikoyan and 
Suslov that the Hungarian government was strong.92 Despite Molotov's sober 
assessment, Khrushchev, as late as November 2-3, during his meeting with Tito 
on Brioni Island, apparently believed that at least some Hungarian workers could 
be mobilized against Nagy: 
the workers in the Miskolc region, where Hungarian miners had remai-
ned loyal though reactionaries were in power. The Czechs had given the 
miners some arms and it might be possible to try some political action 
against Nagy with the help of those Hungarian miners or jointly with 
them." 
Since Tito's death in 1980 numerous biographies of him have appeared, 
reappraising his character and policies. They challenge the orthodox view of his 
official biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, and describe Tito's skills of Realpolitik.94 
Undoubtedly Tito — like the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — sincerely 
believed in the superiority of the "Yugoslav way" and the equality of all com-
munist countries. Yet, as an experienced politician, he must have realized the 
usefulness of the third-path rhetoric. Permitting his subordinates freedom of 
expression won the approval of American policymakers, especially of Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles. 
At the same time, much like Dulles's own "Liberation" rhetoric, it created 
the illusion of being on the offensive, of encouraging Nagy and his supporters. 
("Liberation," it will be recalled, was coined by Dulles during the 1952 presiden-
tial campaign to present the American people with an alternative to the more 
passive-sounding "containment" strategy of Truman and the Democrats, whom 
Dulles accused of being "soft on communism.")95 To some degree, Tito's call 
for "alternative roads to communism" served to mask his own secret fears about 
the Hungarian rebellion. 
Tito's Secrcl Fears 
Like Khrushchev, Tito was caught off guard by the October-Novembcr, 1956 
events in Hungary, specifically when the Hungarians' anti-Stalinist mood shifted 
to an anti-communist mood. Publicly Tito was propounding the third-path 
rhetoric, "different roads to socialism," and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign countries. It was known that Nagy, like Tito, was also 
attracted to the Five Principles (Pancha Shila) propounded at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference. In early 1956 Imre Nagy was writing his book, In Defense of the 
New Course, the third chaptcr of which is devoted to these principles.96 Nagy 
argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the 
capitalist system, but also "to the relations between the countries within the 
democratic and socialist camp."9 ' (Interestingly, according to the Malin notes, 
the Pancha Shila was mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on 
October 30, 1956 by Lazar Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they should 
propose that wc build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.")98 
Despite his outward support of Nagy, inwardly Tito felt threatened by 
Nagy's movement. With the opening of the communist party archives, it can be 
seen that Tito's perspective changed as discontent turned into violence in 
Hungary.99 Tito realized the potential of nationalist (non-communist) "spillover" 
into multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. He had always been careful to conceal the fact that 
he was born into a peasant family from north Croatia and actually fought on the 
Austrian-Hungarian side against Serbia in I914,'<X! It was much easier to 
encourage faraway Poland, than nearby Hungary. Between October 31 and 
November 1, the leading Yugoslav newspaper Borha stopped supporting the 
Nagy government and began denouncing its connection to "right-wing elements." 
Indeed, as his own fears of spillover intensified, Tito probably began to em-
pathize somewhat with the Russians concerning their fear of the possible 
spillover of Yugoslav ideas into other communist bloc countries. 
Recently opened archives provide some detail about Tito's fears.101 In his 
letter of November 8 to Khrushchev (and later on November II in his speech at 
Pula), Tito stated clearly that he had agreed with Khrushchev on the need to 
intervene.102 In fact, Khrushchev himself apparently was surprised at how 
readily Tito agreed with him on the need to intervene.104 Moreover, Tito was 
quoted often by the Soviet Presidium as having asked rhetorically: "What kind of 
a revolutionary, what kind of communist, could Nagy be, if with his knowledge 
they hanged and shot leading workers, communists and public figures?"104 Two 
months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in Firiubin, the Soviet ambas-
sador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head [podnial golovuj, especi-
ally in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited the employees of 
the Yugoslav security organs to violence." After Firiubin told him that his speech 
in Pula, and the speech of Yugoslav Vicc-Prcsidcnt Eduard Kardelj later, made a 
bad impression in Moscow, Tito said, "1 did not want to complicate in any way 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations."105 The Soviet Presidium also claimed that Tito 
himself had plans to intervene militarily in Hungary.10" Tito, in his talk with the 
Soviet military delegation on Brioni Island on November 18, 1956, allegedly 
declared, "If the Soviet troops were not used to put down the insurrection, then 
Yugoslav troops, which were by that time braced [podtianutyi] on the Yugoslav-
Hungarian border, would have been sent in for that purpose."107 (Khrushchev 
himself may have thought about a possible Yugoslav intervention when he said 
during the October 31 CC CPSU Presidium meeting "We should negotiate with 
Tito... There will be no large-scale war.")108 In a conversation with Andropov, 
Kadar said, "The Yugoslavs apparently are trying to save Nagy not bccause they 
need him, but because they fear he can cause some undesirable things for 
them."109 
Tito's fears about spillover come into focus when one considers the larger 
historical context of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. Tt is worth remembering that 
the state of Yugoslavia was created by incorporating large parts of southern 
Hungary after World War One. In November 1918 the autonomous Kingdom of 
Croatia severed its ties with the Kingdom of Hungary and the Serbs took control 
of the Bacska, the Baranya, and the western Banal, presenting the Hungarians 
with a fait accompli. The Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), sanctioned these 
territorial changes. In fact, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its pre-war 
territory. The territory ceded to Rumania alone — Transylvania and half of the 
Banat — was larger than the area left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia gained 
Slovakia and Ruthcnia, while other, much smaller areas were awarded to Austria, 
Italy, and Poland. Whereas in 1914 approximately 21 million people lived in 
Hungary, by 1920 Hungary had under 8 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, 
many Hungarians — including those living in Vojvodina and elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia — clamored in the interwar years to have the Trianon Treaty re-
vised.110 
Later, during World War II, Hungary became increasingly dependent on 
Hitler's Germany. The Hungarian prime minister Laszlo Bardossy (who took 
over in 1941 when his predecessor, Pal Tclcki, committed suicide) ordered the 
Hungarian army to follow in the steps of the German Wehrmacht on 1 I April 
1941 by invading Yugoslavia and occupying parts of the Vojvodina. Thanks to 
German support, Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometers with 5 
million inhabitants, including over 2 million Magyars.111 
During the war a strong Serbian partisan movement under Communist 
leadership developed in occupied Yugoslavia, particularly in the Vojvodina. The 
Hungarian military command there responded by anti-partisan raids and summary 
executions. The largest anti-partisan campaign took place in Novi Sad (the main 
city in the Vojvodina) late in January 1942, when units of the Hungarian military 
and gendarmerie executed a great many suspected partizans — estimates range 
f rom several hundred to a few thousand — mainly Serbs and Jews. At the end of 
1944, the Serbs reoccupied Vojvodina. Between 1941 and 1944 Serbian propa-
gandists had exaggerated the size and extent of the massacre in Novi Sad. Not 
surprisingly, a far more bloody Serbian vendetta was carried out against the 
Hungarian population. Tito, the commander-in-chief of the partisan army at the 
time, condoned the campaign of violence and apparently issued verbal orders to 
his partisans to avenge all "injustices" suffered by partisans and Serbs during the 
four years of the war.112 
During the following years, bitter emotions abounded on both the 
Hungarian and Yugoslav sides. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift gave the Hungarian 
Stalinists like Rakosi and Gero the opportunity to vilify all "Titoists" and the 
Yugoslav minority in Hungary generally. Thus, given the history of Yugoslav-
Hungarian relations, Tito no doubt feared that the ethnic Hungarian minority in 
northern Yugoslavia, consisting of over half-a-million people, would help spread 
the ideas of the Hungarian Revolution inside his own country. 
On the question of exactly who Tito had in mind to succeed Rakosi as 
Hungary's leader the evidence is unclear. While some scholars have asserted 
that Tito wholeheartedly favored Nagy as a replacement for Rakosi, there is 
surprisingly little evidence in the Soviet archives to prove this.113 On the contra-
ry, Soviet sources indicate that Tito seemed willing — although unenthusiasti-
cally -— to tolerate the Stalinist Gero, but would have preferred Janos Kadar114 or 
Zoltan Szanto to head the new post-Rakosi regime."' When Tito was informed 
by Kurimszki that "Rakosi had resigned," he never mentioned Nagy's name.116 
Of course, this may be because Nagy was not readmitted to the Hungarian 
communist party until October 14, 1956. However, it appears that Tito did not 
regard Nagy as highly as did the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in the 
summer of 1956. 
Indeed, as much as he detested Rakosi, perhaps he was willing to tolerate 
Rakosi in the interest of maintaining calm relations between the Yugoslav and 
Hungarian communist parties.11 ' As he said in July 1956 to the envoy Kurim-
szki: 
Whomever the Hungarian people choose and recognize as their leader is 
their business... I also said in Moscow that 1 do not support Rakosi, but 
if the Hungarian people want him, then let him be. It is their business. 
We thought and still do think...that the settling of the issues between the 
two parties should not cause shocks to the Hungarian Workers' Party."8 
This is not to say that Tito did not denounce Rakosi during the 1955 Belgrade 
and 1956 Moscow meetings. However, even these negative comments would not 
have persuaded the Khrushchev leadership to dismiss Rakosi in 1955."y The 
contemporary Western press speculated that reparations payments from Hungary 
— which were finally negotiated in May 1956 — may have persuaded Tito to 
end his overt opposition to Rdkosi's incumbency.120 
Moscow finally insisted that Rakosi resign, because the situation in 
Hungary was getting worse. Even the Hungarian Politburo did not want him, but 
they were too afraid to tell Moscow; they were waiting for Moscow to take the 
initiative.121 Of course, Erno Gero, who took Rakosi's place, was no different. 
Hungarians quipped: "In place of a fat Rakosi, we got a thin one." Even Khrush-
chev during the November 3 Presidium meeting remarked candidly: "It is my 
fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gero rather than Kadar."122 
Given his wariness of Imre Nagy, why did Tito offer the latter political 
asylum in his Budapest embassy? Scholars have been puzzled about Tito's 
motives. This event is worth examining in detail, both because Tito's act of 
granting Nagy asylum epitomizes his political philosophy, and because his 
reticence in handing Nagy over to the USSR contributed to a new cold phase in 
Yugoslav relations with both the USSR and Hungary. 
Until the November 4 invasion, most of the Soviet and Hungarian 
remarks were directed against the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in 
Hungary, and against the pro-Nagy reporting of the Hungarian situation by the 
Yugoslav journalists. Even at the Crimea meeting when Khrushchev discussed 
this problem with Tito, he approached it in a delicate way that would enable Tito 
to save face. Tt is plausible that Khrushchev, until the November 4 invasion, had 
been willing to give Tito the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Yugoslav 
journalists and diplomats were simply acting on their own and not on Tito's 
orders.123 But after November 4, when Nagy and forty-one others received 
political refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the Soviet leader attacked 
Tito: How dare Tito shelter this leader of the counterrevolution? Khrushchev was 
enraged. 
The coursc of events is well-known. At 5:20 a.m. Nagy made his last 
appeal on Radio Budapest and then went to the Yugoslav embassy with Zoltan 
Szanto and eleven other party leaders and intellectuals with their families.124 In 
the Yugoslav embassy, Nagy remained safe from the invading Soviet army until 
his final departure from the embassy compound on November 22, 1956. What is 
less known, however, is how exactly Nagy's group ended up in the Yugoslav 
embassy and what Tito's motives were in giving him asylum. From the newly 
available correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito, the following scenario 
emerges. On November 1, Szanto spoke with the Yugoslav ambassador to 
Hungary, Dalibor Soldatic, about the possible need for political asylum. He was 
afraid of possible violence against Hungarian government members by the anti-
communist insurgents. Soldatic gave a preliminary affirmative answer, and 
Szanto was supposed to tell him exactly when he and others would be coming to 
the embassy. Soldatic also informed Tito of this request. 
The "Agreement" at Brioni 
The next day Tito, Rankovic,125 Kardelj, and Veljko Micunovic (the Yugoslav 
Ambassador to the USSR) met with Khrushchev and Malcnkov at Tito's retreat 
on Brioni Island and discussed the Hungarian situation from seven o'clock in the 
evening to five o'clock the next morning. Khrushchev and Malcnkov informed 
the Yugoslav leaders of Moscow's plans for invading Hungary, but not the actual 
date. As mentioned earlier, by November 3 Tito had agreed with Khrushchev 
both on the need to intervene militarily and on the wisdom of selecting Kadar as 
the new leader. Tito also agreed to try to persuade Nagy to issue a declaration 
announcing his own resignation, admit his inability to stop the violence in the 
country, and proclaim his support for the new Kadar government.126 During the 
course of the conversation, according to Micunovic, Tito informed Khrushchev 
about Szanto's request for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy: 
They [Khrushchev and Malenkov] again asked what possibilities we had 
of trying to do something about Nagy. Apart from Losonczy we 
mentioned Zoltan Szantd, who has already asked for asylum in our 
embassy because of the danger of reprisals. It seems to us that such 
people are not to be distrusted, because they are decent folk with good 
127 intentions. 
The question arises: if Khrushchev objected so much to Nagy's refuge in the 
Yugoslav embassy, why did he not protest this possible scenario when it was 
first broachcd during the meeting at Brioni? Several answers can be deduced. 
First, Tito apparently mentioned only Szanto, and not Nagy, so perhaps Khrush-
chev did not realize that Nagy himself might also seek asylum in the Yugoslav 
embassy. Second, the most pressing conccrn for Khrushchev and Malenkov at 
the time was getting Tito's support for the intervention and his promise to try to 
persuade Nagy to resign and announce publicly his support for the Kadar 
government. It was clcar to the Yugoslavs thai Khrushchev had already decided 
to intervene, and that he merely wanted Tito's ex post facto approval — not his 
advice or permission. Khrushchev needed Tito's help in making the Soviet 
invasion look more legitimate to the international community, which would then 
facilitate the "normalization" in Hungary. 
In addition, since Tito had been surprisingly supportive of the Soviet 
invasion plan, Khrushchev evidently assumed that, even if Nagy sought asylum 
in the Yugoslav embassy, Tito would quickly turn Nagy over to the Soviet 
authorities. This is indicated in the telegram of November 4, in which Khrush-
chev instructed Soviet Ambassador Firiubin to tell Eduard Kardelj, Deputy Head 
of the Yugoslav Government, that 
as far as the further sojourn of Nagy and his group in the embassy, 
excesses could occur with them, not only by the reaction but also by the 
revolutionary elements. Thus, bearing in mind that the Hungarian 
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government [headed by Kadar] does not 
have security organs at present, it would be expedient to deliver Nagy 
and his group to our troops for transport to the Revolutionary Worker-
Peasant government in Szolnok.12* 
Despite Tito's assent to "work on Nagy," what complicated matters was Khrush-
chev's silence about when the invasion would begin. Micunovic writes: 
The Russians still said nothing about when their troops would intervene. 
Wc can't ask them, and they don't want to say. For that reason the time 
factor remains unclear: We don't know what opportunity we may have 
to influence Nagy and try to reduce the number of casualties and the 
amount of unnecessary bloodshed. But we agreed that wc would try and 
influence Nagy.124 
Before Szanto could reply to Soldatic about when he would seek asylum, 
the actual invasion had begun, on November 4. Soldatic called Nagy at 1;00 a.m. 
on the same day in the Hungarian Parliament building and invited him to the 
Yugoslav embassy. Thus, on the basis of the first tentative conversation on 
November 1, the Nagy group fled to the embassy.130 
Since Tito had mentioned Szanto's request during the Brioni meeting, he 
apparently concluded that Khrushchev condoned the possible offer of asylum to 
the Hungarian leaders. This is indicated in the November 4 telegram in which 
Firiubin wrote: 
Kardelj reported that on the night of November 4 they called Imre 
Nagy, as it had been agreed with comrade Khrushchev... It is still not 
clear, said Kardelj, whether or not Imre Nagy made his last declaration 
in the name of the government in Budapest. If he did make this declar-
ation, then they, the Yugoslavs will try to get him to state that he made 
it under pressure from the reactionaries. They also intend to persuade 
Imre Nagy to make a declaration of support for the government headed 
by Kadar in Szolnok. In Kardelj's words such a declaration will facilitate 
discussion of the Hungarian question in the Security Council and 
[facilitate diplomatic] recognition of Kadar's government as the legiti-
mate government.131 
This means that Nagy's group was already in the embassy before the Yugoslavs 
knew that Nagy had declared Hungary's neutrality.132 
Later, in explaining to Khrushchev why he had granted asylum to Nagy, 
Tito cited the sheer "speed of events" and "absence of detailed information."133 
"This problem... in the final analysis... is a result of our conversation on Brioni, 
although because of the events in Hungary, things developed differently than we 
expected," he wrote. The conversation between Szanto and Soldatic had already 
taken place before the Brioni meeting, and Tito did inform Khrushchev of it. 
Khrushchev appears to be the one to blame for the initial presence of Nagy's 
group in the Yugoslav embassy, since he did not tell Tito at Brioni that the offer 
of political asylum to Nagy was unacceptable. He also did not give Tito a 
reasonable amount of time in which to persuade Nagy to make the declaration 
supporting Kadar. Soviet troops went into action less than twenty-four hours 
after Khrushchev and Malenkov left Tito at Brioni. 
The quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders developed later 
when Khrushchcv realized that Tito would not easily relinquish Nagy and his 
group. It was simply incomprehensible to Khrushchev that Tito could continue to 
harbour Nagy, the "leader of the counterrevolution," when Tito had been so 
understanding during the Brioni meeting. 
The Soviets then, in all likelihood, decided to intimidate the Yugoslavs in 
another, non-verbal, way. By explicitly mentioning in the November 4 telegram 
that "excesses" could occur, the Soviets seem to have been preparing a cover for 
a little-known event that took place on November 5 at 3:30 p.m.133 On this day 
a Soviet tank fired on the Yugoslav embassy. The cultural attache Milcnko 
Milovanov was killed in the gunfire, the building was damaged, and all the 
windows were shattered. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Ko£a Popovic, accused 
the Soviet authorities of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy, know 
ing that it was indeed the Yugoslav embassy and that Imre Nagy and his 
supporters were inside.135 To reinforce Popovic's complaint, the Yugoslav 
ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Micunovic, visited the Soviet minister of 
foreign affairs, Dmitri Shepilov, the next day.136 Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav 
ambassador in Budapest, also complained about the incident to Andropov. 
Soldatic requested that Soviet tanks near the Yugoslav embassy be moved. 
Andropov relayed this message to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet deputy foreign 
minister, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit 
from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature."13 ' 
As we know from Malin's notes, these messages were discussed at the 
Presidium meeting by Khrushchev, Zhukov and Shepilov. A cable was prepared 
for the Yugoslav government and transmitted via Firyubin to Popovic.138 On 
November 9, 1956 a commission composed of Major-General K.E. Grebennik,'3y 
Colonel K.V. Boskoboinik, and Major A. B. Lukin conducted an investigation of 
the circumstances.140 The Yugoslav government later presented a claim of 
$84,446 to Hungary for the death of Milovanov.141 
Although the Soviet officials claimed that it was an accident, the attack 
on the Yugoslav mission could very well have been deliberate (although this 
cannot be verified until other documents from the Soviet military archives are 
declassified). The Soviet leaders resented Tito for giving the Nagy group 
political refuge, and this would have been an easy way to take revenge. They 
had both the motive and the opportunity, and the incident could be readily 
explained. After all, Tito himself had earlier asked the Soviet government to 
"take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it."142 
From the Yugoslav point of view, once Nagy's presence in the embassy 
became known throughout the world, the situation changed; Tito was caught in a 
dilemma. As Micunovic aptly articulated it: "[the Soviets] have decided to sling 
mud at Yugoslavia as the organizer of the counterrevolution if we don't hand 
Imre Nagy and the others over to them. But if we do hand them over, they will 
then point to us as a country which does not keep its word and which nobody 
should depend on."143 
Tito concluded that he might as well take advantage of this opportunity to 
persuade Nagy to resign — something he had promised Khrushchev he would 
do. As Tito wrote in his letter to Khrushchev, the act of granting asylum to 
Nagy "did not contradict the Brioni agreement."144 The Yugoslavs, Tito assured 
Khrushchev, wanted the same thing Khrushchev and Kadar wanted: a strong 
communist government in Hungary. They had sincerely tried to persuade Nagy 
to declare his support for Kadar.'4" The fact that Nagy turned out to be stub-
bom, Tito noted, should not be blamed on the Yugoslav Communist Party.146 
Furthermore, as he tried to explain to Khrushchev, not all of the members of 
Nagy's group were "anti-Soviet"; some were "honest communists" who would be 
great assets to Kadar's new government. What was wrong with offering them 
asylum?147 Zoltan Szanto, for example, was one of the original leaders of the 
underground Hungarian communist party; he helped recruit Hungarians into the 
communist party while at a POW camp near Suzdal in the USSR in 1943.148 He 
had also once been the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia, and was highly 
regarded by the Yugoslavs. Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders also evidently 
believed that, once Nagy and his group left the embassy and "confronted the 
actual situation," they would eventually "abandon their quixotic attitude" and 
"realize that they have to contribute to the building of socialism."149 
When Tito refused to turn in the Nagy group, Khrushchev began to 
accuse him of protecting Nagy, the very man Tito had described at the Brioni 
meeting as having "cleared the path for counterrevolution." From the Soviet 
viewpoint, offering Nagy political asylum was a supreme example of "interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of Hungary."150 The longer Tito kept Nagy, the more 
convincing became the reports filed by the Soviet diplomats and Hungarian 
officials in Budapest in 1955 and in the early months of 1956. As time passed, 
the accusations became more shrill. Tito, the Soviet leaders said, had "warned 
Nagy of the upcoming invasion."1 M This "Titoist perfidy" no doubt strengthened 
the clout of Molotov's Stalinist faction in the Soviet government. Molotov had 
opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Tito, and was later ousted in 1957 for his 
"erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question." (He apparently believed that even 
Kadar was too much of a "Titoist;" during the November 4 CC CPSU Presidium 
meeting Molotov urged his colleagues to exert more pressure on Kadar "so that 
Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia. ")1SJ 
Tt is true that the Yugoslavs did "warn" Nagy about the invasion; Soldatic 
called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on November 4 and told him.15' But by then probably 
everyone could see that an invasion was imminent. Also, Soldatic could not have 
known exactly when the Soviet invasion would begin, so if he had warned the 
Hungarians, it was only in a very general way. 
Given Tito's wariness of Nagy, his agreement with Khrushchcv on the 
need to intervene,IS4 and his desire for harmonious relations with the USSR, one 
must ask: why did Tito not quickly hand Nagy and his associates over to the 
Soviets? Why did he object to sending them to Romania, Khrushchev's chosen 
destination for the group? 
The answer lies, again, with Tito's values and fears. He valued Yugosla-
via's reputation as a responsible, sovereign state, and was convinced that 
Yugoslavia should honor the principles of international law as befits such a state. 
It is noteworthy that Tito kept the Brioni meeting with Khrushchev secret from 
the Yugoslav public for several days, to avoid tarnishing Yugoslavia's repu-
tation. '" Once Nagy's presence in his embassy became widely known, Tito took 
the concept of political asylum seriously. In his February 1957 letter to the 
CPSU's Central Committee, Tito maintained that he could not "violate his word 
and simply give up these people," citing the Yugoslav constitution on the issue 
of political asylum.156 
Apart from this reason, one must also remember Tito's considerable skills 
in realpolitik. Just as the "third-path" rhctoric served a dual purpose (winning the 
approval of both the Yugoslav people and U.S. policymakers), so sheltering 
Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy served both to incarcerate Nagy (thereby defus-
ing the uprising), and also to win the approval of the international community 
for "protecting" Nagy from the Soviet aggressors. As Micunovic wrote: "[i]t 
could not be disputed that the fact that the Nagy government had in effect 
disappeared from the moment it entered the Yugoslav embassy had proved useful 
and had helped both Kadar and the Russians."157 
Tito could then take advantage of Nagy's presence in the embassy to coax 
him to cooperate with the Kadar government. If he could discredit Nagy, perhaps 
he could reduce the chances of anti-communist "spillover" into Yugoslavia. Tito 
was so sure he could get Nagy to support the Kadar regime that he believed the 
Yugoslav embassy might be attacked "when the reaction finds out that Nagy, 
who is in the embassy, supports the Kadar government."158 
Tito understood the political advantage of seeming (to the West) as if he 
were protecting Nagy. Although Tito himself may not have fully supported 
Nagy's movement when it turned anti-communist, some observers in the West 
thought that he did. To simply hand Nagy's group over to Kadar and the Rus-
sians would destroy Yugoslavia's reputation as an independent sovereign country 
with respect for human rights. Meanwhile, those domestic opponents who knew 
how Yugoslav prisoners at Goli Otok were treated did not dare to contradict Tito 
and his followers. 
During the rift of 1948-55, Tito had discovered the advantages of being 
neutral, even before the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser did. U. S. Secret-
ary of State John Foster Dulles had been eager to extend economic aid to 
Yugoslavia, confident that the Yugoslav example would encourage Hungary and 
the other Soviet satellites to fight for independence. In a speech to the Four-H 
Club in Chicago in 1954, Dulles said: 
In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international commu-
nism and reasserted its own nationalism. Now, the Soviet Union treats 
Yugoslavia with deference while it continues to treat with contempt the 
puppet governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. That may 
embolden the satellites to demand a measure of independence.1'9 
When Dulles visited Tito in May 1955, Tito ostensibly told him what he 
wanted to hear, speaking about "independence," rather than about "national 
communism." He told Dulles that the "transformation in the satellite countries" 
would take place faster than Dulles could even imagine, and that he, Tito, was 
trying to accclcratc this process, so the satellites would become independent, 
which Tito wanted very much.160 In the tightly bipolar world of the 1950s, both 
superpowers vied for client states among the neutral countries. Tito could 
pretend to do the bidding of each superpower, but neither would know his real 
intentions. 
Moreover, if Tito had simply handed Nagy over to Kadar's government, 
Khrushchev might have been encouraged to see Yugoslavia as just another 
obedient Soviet satellite. Tito feared the prospect of Yugoslavia once again 
getting pulled back into the Soviet camp. He had swallowed his pride enough at 
the Crimea meeting, when he assured Khrushchev that he had "no fundamental 
disagreements," and that in Yugoslavia "only a different method of building 
socialism [was] being applied." Khrushchev had replied, "The methods and 
forms can differ, but there must be a single principled line." Tito had agreed: 
socialism can never be divided into various sorts; it is a "single revolutionary 
doctrine, which we, communists, should adhere to."161 
Thus, respecting Nagy's political asylum was a useful way of reminding 
Khrushchev that he, Tito — despite the official normalization of Soviet-Yugo-
slav relations — would still act independently, even if that displeased the 
Kremlin. His concern for Nagy's physical safety probably stemmed more from 
his determination to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation than from 
any desire to encourage Nagy and his plans for a multiparty system in Hun-
gary.162 
As if to retaliate for Tito's stubbornness in holding on to Nagy, the Soviet 
leaders made a deliberate decision on November 17 to kidnap the Nagy group as 
soon as it left the Yugoslav embassy.161 On November 22 a bus was driven up 
to the embassy's doorsteps, supposedly to transport Nagy and the other asylum 
seekers to their apartments. While the Hungarians were climbing into the bus, a 
Soviet military official also entered the bus, despite the Yugoslavs' vehement 
protests. (The bus driver was also a Russian.) To make sure that the Hungarians 
were taken to their homes, the diplomat Milan Georgievic and military attache 
Milan Drosa were ordered to accompany the group. The bus proceeded just 
around the corner from the embassy when the Soviet officer forced Georgievic 
and Drosa to get off. The bus took the Nagy group first to the closest Soviet 
military headquarters and then continued on to Romania where the group was 
imprisoned, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the 
Yugoslavs.164 
What angered Tito so much about the kidnapping was the blatant 
deception. Nothing quite stings the ego as outright betrayal after lengthy nego-
tiations in good faith.165 In an official letter to the CC CPSU on November 24, 
Tito wrote: 
The Yugoslav government regards the abovementioned action a crude 
violation of the agreement negotiated with the Hungarian government. 
The [actions taken by the K&d£r government]... are completely incon-
sistent with the agreement. The Yugoslav government cannot accept the 
version that Nagy and the others voluntarily went to Romania, since it 
was known... — while they were still here in the Yugoslav embassy — 
that they wanted to stay in their own country. The Yugoslav government 
expresses an energetic protest to the Hungarian government, and de-
mands that the agreement be followed immediately. [Failure to do so] 
will damage Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [Tjhe... violation of the agree-
ment is in complete contradiction of widely recognized international 
legal norms.166 
Tito's indignation probably equalled or surpassed the outrage Nagy felt 
when he had realized that the negotiations on November 3 for Soviet troop 
withdrawal had been a complete hoax. Until November 22, the discussions 
concerning the Nagy group's departure from the Yugoslav embassy had been 
conductcd between Dobrivoje Vidic, Tito's delegate, and representatives of the 
Kadar government. The document that had emerged from these talks "guaran-
t ee^ ] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the 
Yugoslavs responsible" for past events.167 
Both of these pledges were broken: Nagy and several others were abduc-
ted, and Yugoslavia was blamed for fostering the "counterrevolution" in 
Hungary. This deception, Tito felt, had made Yugoslavia a laughingstock in the 
international community. Characteristically enough, the Romanian (and probably 
Soviet) officials were surprised that Tito was so angry about the abduction; they 
thought he might even raise the issue at the United Nations.168 During the 
November 27 meeting of the CPSU's Presidium, Khrushchev expressed his regret 
about Soviet involvement in the kidnapping. "It was a mistake for our officer to 
go into the bus," he said, according to notes taken by Malin's deputy Vladimir 
Chernukha. He thought the matter should have been left up to the Hungarians. 
For the Yugoslavs it felt like a "return to 1948."170 
Tito's disappointment extended to Kadar. As early as the summer of 
1956, Tito had favored Kadar as a possible replacement for Rakosi.1"' At the 
November meeting on Brioni Island, the Yugoslavs persuaded Khrushchev and 
Malenkov to choose Kadar rather than Miinnich to head Hungary's new Revol-
utionary Worker-Peasant Government, since Kadar had been in prison while 
Stalin and Rakosi had been in power, whereas Miinnich had been Hungarian 
ambassador to the USSR.172 (This was clearly a wise choice, sincc Miinnich was 
evidently involved in the plans to abduct the Nagy group.)171 Kadar had given 
his word concerning the Nagy group; now he had turned out to be almost as 
deceitful as Rakosi. 
It should be pointed out here, however, that Kadar was not as hawkish 
during the October-November 1956 events as most books published in the West 
have portrayed him. In fact — as the Malin notes reveal — Kadctr did not at first 
advocate a massive Soviet military intervention. At the CC CPSU Presidium 
meeting on November 2, Kadar warned the Soviet leaders that "the use of 
military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed" and would "erode the 
authority of the socialist countries," causing "the morale of the Communists [in 
Hungary] to be reduced to zero."174 
Ironically Kadar was deceitful in the one area where Western accounts 
have been more forgiving of him: the abduction of the Nagy group. Most writers 
have expressed the view that Kadar had not known about the kidnapping plan 
and had disapproved of the Soviet treatment of Imre Nagy.175 But recently 
declassified documents indicate that Kadar knew and approved of the secret 
KGB plan to arrest Nagy and the others the minute they stepped outside the 
Yugoslav embassy.176 If Nagy remained in Hungary, Kadar worried, he would 
inspire the Hungarian "reactionaries." Rumours about an American intervention 
vexed him as well.177 Sporadic gunfire in Budapest could be heard until Decem-
ber and widespread passive resistance continued into 1957. To gain the peoples' 
cooperation, Kadar had to resort to lies, namely, that he would share power with 
Nagy as soon as Nagy returned from the Yugoslav embassy. Clearly, Kadar 
wanted Nagy taken out of Hungary — not to Yugoslavia (technically a neutral 
country), but to Romania (at the time a loyal Soviet satellite). He knew that if 
Nagy went to Yugoslavia, "there would be two existing Hungarian governments: 
one there, and one here in Budapest."178 
Not surprisingly, given Tito's disappointment with Kadar, Hungarian-
Yugoslav relations cooled after the "Nagy affair." Hungarian diplomats snubbed 
their Yugoslav colleagues by rejecting the latters' invitations to social events, and 
by declining to invite the Yugoslavs to their own social events."4 Thus, 
Yugoslav-Hungarian relations had coine full circle. This clear ease of betrayal 
began a brief new cold war between Hungary and Yugoslavia. In preparation for 
the Nagy trial, the judicial proceedings of which were initiated in February 
1957,180 the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries went to great lengths to 
gather data on Yugoslavia's "role in the Hungarian counterrevolution." in 
November 1957 the Yugoslav delegation alone refused to attend the celebration 
of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow and sign a 
declaration affirming the Soviet Union's leading role in the communist move-
ment. In late April 1958 the Soviet leaders then refused to send a delegation (o 
the Yugoslavs' Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana, where a documenl was 
signed that rejected the USSR's claim to any leading role in the communist 
movement. Evidently at this time Khrushchev also decided to act on an earlier 
decision to punish Imre Nagy. On June 16, 1958 Imre Nagy was hanged. The 
Hungarian authorities warned the Yugoslavs not to make a fuss about the 
execution, or they would publish more "evidence" of Yugoslav involvement in 
the Hungarian events. Jovo Kapicic, the new Yugoslav ambassador replied that 
the Nagy trial was just "another link in the chain of the new anti-Yugoslav 
campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other bloc countries."181 The 
Yugoslavs were keenly aware of the similarities between the Nagy trial and the 
Rajk trial nine years earlier.182 
Conclusions 
This article has attempted to show that, despite Moscow's rapprochement with 
Tito's Yugoslavia in 1955, tensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia remained. 
Rdkosi's Hungary had played a leading role in the anti-Tito campaign in the late 
1940s, and Tito wanted a full apology. The Hungarian government's reluctance 
promptly to redress other Yugoslav grievances also helped to prevent the 
achievement of a full reconciliation between Belgrade and Budapest. These 
outstanding issues included: the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, amnesty to all 
Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, fair treatment of Hungary's Yugoslav 
minority, and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia. At the same time, 
Hungary's communist leaders also had complaints: they — as well as Soviet 
officials — resented the uncensored, pro-Nagy coverage manifest in the Yugo-
slav media. It should also be mentioned in this connection that reports by 
Yugoslav journalists and diplomats contributed to a Soviet misinterpretation of 
the Hungarian revolutionary movement's origins: the Soviet leaders came to 
believe that only a small core of intellectuals — not the masses of workers and 
peasants — was causing problems. Thus if only Tito would use his influence to 
help silence the "troublemakers," they thought, the conflict in Hungary could be 
resolved. 
The newly-surfaced documentary evidence offers glimpses of the attitudes 
that prevailed at the time in Belgrade. There it was realized that while reconcili-
ation with Hungary (and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially, it also 
brought a risk of renewed domination by the Soviet bloc. Tito in particular 
valued Yugoslavia's status as a neutral, nonaligned country that could stand up to 
Joseph Stalin. At the same time, the Yugoslav leader was also wary of the 
nationalist ferment of the Hungarian revolution, and in early November worked 
with Khrushchcv behind the scenes to prevent it from spreading to Yugoslavia. 
The history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, from World War I and the 1920 
Trianon Treaty to World War II and the Serbian partisans' revenge against the 
Hungarians in the Vojvodina, provided a basis for Tito's fears of a spillover. 
Indeed, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has demonstrated that Tito 
certainly had good reasons to fear ethnic conflicts in his own country. 
Tito's willingness to shelter Imre Nagy after the Soviet crackdown in 
Hungary, and Kadar's collusion in his abduction, served to open all the old 
wounds in Yugoslav relations with Hungary — as well as with the USSR. 
Ironically, Khrushchev was just as chagrined as Tito about the new rift between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Yet, had it not been for the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 
early 1960s, the events of November 1956 might have led to another complete 
break between Yugoslavia and the bloc countries closest to the USSR. 
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Semmelweis as Literary Hero 
George Bisztray 
Semmelweis, Saviour of Mothers! This epithet was coined by Jeno Rakosi half 
a century after the death of the famed physician.1 While Rakosi himself was 
later called an "arch-conservative" and a "reactionary" by the communists, they 
borrowed the epithet. The life of Doctor Semmelweis reminds one of a classical 
Greek tragedy, for which reason the Semmelweis story has over the years been 
the subject of a number of films and plays. In 1939 and in 1952 films were 
made about him in Hungary, directed by L6sz!o Kalmar and Frigyes Ban, 
respectively. In 1950 an East German movie celebrated "Semmelweis, Retter der 
Mutter" ("Saviour of Mothers"). 
In this article, 1 shall outline variations on a theme by three playwrights: 
the Norwegian Jens Bj0rneboe; the American Howard Sackler; and the Hungar-
ian Gyorgy Szaraz. I shall also mention an unusual lyrical prose work by the 
famous French author Louis-Ferdinand Celine — himself a medical doctor —- in 
which the figure of Semmelweis is used to propagate Celine's own, distinctively 
Nietzschean world-view. 
Who was Semmelweis, and how can we conceive him as a classical 
tragic hero? Ignac Fiilop (in German: Ignaz Philip) Semmelweis was born in 
Buda in 1818. He studied medicine in Vienna, and started his practice there in 
the obstetric ward of the Allgemeines Krankenhaus (General Hospital). Since 
well-to-do women gave birth at home, Semmelweis's patients were mostly 
working-class women and prostitutes. It was a matter of common knowledge, 
but only the newcomer Semmelweis found it significant that in the section of the 
ward where midwives attended the death rate from a mysterious illness called 
childbed fever was much lower than in the section where delivery was assisted 
by medical doctors. After much observation and experimentation, Semmelweis 
found a connection between this circumstance and another factor. Unbelievable 
as it sounds now, obstetricians and interns in those days also conducted dissec-
tions of and even practiced delivery on cadavers. Semmelweis eventually came 
to the conclusion that childbed fever was neither God's will nor an irrational 
event but a case of endemic poisoning caused by bacteria carried on decom-
posing particles of organic matter. He also found the remedy: thorough hand 
washing with a solution of lime. 
As the Semmelweis myth goes, the envious medical establishment reacted 
disgracefully, belittling Semmelweis's finding, ridiculing his commitment to 
truth, eventually simply claiming his achievement. The historian, physician, and 
Hungarian patriot, Istvan Benedek points out in an introduction to Semmelweis's 
essays, that Semmelweis was neither a martyr nor a national hero but a man of 
difficult nature: cantankerous, often rude, and unable to explain his theory in a 
voluminous, book-size work. Instead, he wasted his life writing polemic letters 
to colleagues all over the world.2 This may have been true for the last five years 
of his life when, after the belated publication of his magnum opus? Semmelweis 
initiated a vituperate correspondence with those who were slow to accept his 
findings. Semmelweis the medical student and young doctor, on the other hand, 
was remembered as a good-natured and popular member of the Viennese 
Hungarian community.4 Long years full of disappointments, and a general 
embittering of his disposition, made him the man that Benedek described. 
Although scientifically he was right, Semmelweis tried to prove his thesis in the 
wrong way. He died in 1865 in the same mental hospital (in Dobling, Austria) 
where the great statesman Istvan Szechenyi had died five years earlier.5 
Semmelweis's achievement was probably never acknowledged on its own merits; 
medical literature attributes his method to the German Virchow, the Scotsman 
Simpson, and even to others. 
A Hungarian fate, one may say, bringing to mind similar examples, such 
as Janos Bolyai who was ignored in favour of Karl Friedrich Gauss, or Anyos 
Jedlik disregarded in favour of Werner von Siemens. In the field of inventions 
it is, indeed, difficult to prove primacy, and the children of smaller nations feel 
this especially painfully. Nevertheless, a misunderstood genius always makes a 
good tragic figure. Semmelweis exemplifies hubris: the tragic lack of knowledge 
or awareness. In his case, it is knowledge of the fact that the medical institution 
is part of the social structure, guided not only by scientific truth but also by 
hierarchical individual interests, political considerations, and personal informal 
connections. In other words, science is practiced by human beings who are 
fallible. In fact, they are all too frequently vain, jealous, and often engage in 
intrigues, insolence, this other definition of hubris, also holds true for Semmel-
weis. 
Enough of the biographical facts. We have on hand three dramas about 
the same person. Their authors agree in many respects, almost to the point of 
repeating each other. Yet, the different cultures and times that produced them 
lends each one its distinctive character. The same hero provides an instance for 
the three authors to air their ideas. Thus, of equal importance with their main 
character are the playwrights themselves. Who were they? 
Jens Bj0rneboe (1920-1976) was an enfant terrible of post-Second World 
War Norwegian literature. Labelled in turn a leftist, anarchist, and populist, 
actually his persistent aim was to provoke the middle class. Bj0rneboe also 
participated in an almost forgotten trend, once somewhat naively called the 
Scandinavian sexual revolution, which should be mentioned because this, too, 
left its trace on his drama about Semmelweis. 
Bj0rneboe's introduction to the play is,6 indeed, a sort of anarchist 
manifesto. Looking back at the "upheavals of 1968, the playwright proclaims that 
all present societies are authoritarian, unreformable, and therefore they have to 
be torn down. The play, which is not meant to be historically accurate, illus-
trates the conflict between independent and authoritarian thinking. It begins with 
a narrative frame connecting present and past: a group of radical students occupy 
the theatre and announce a performance about how highly educated people 
become the tools of oppression. As Markusovszky, a "progressive" colleague of 
Semmelweis explains later on: "Whores and professors have no homeland. They 
serve anyone who pays them."7 
Bj0rncboe insists that the conspiracy against Semmelweis was primarily 
politically motivated. Doctor Klein, Semmelweis's earlier supervisor and arch-
enemy, calls the doctor a political rebel. Bj0rneboe's hero reminds one of 
another, more famous Norwegian stage character: Henrik Ibsen's nonconformist 
Doctor Stockmann in An Enemy of the People — especially when he says: "the 
whole world is wrong and I am right." Plenty of the author's own ideas are 
present, however: besides anarchism and the neo-Marxist illusion of leadership 
by enlightened intellectuals, there is a populist twist when a prostitute makes 
Semmelweis realize how important regular baths are in preventing sickness; and, 
a sanitation worker (in other words, a latrine cleaner) tells him of the antiseptic 
quality of lime solution. Voilal The belief in proven popular wisdom winning 
over affected intellectual superstitions. The sexual bandwagon rolls by: Sem-
melweis likes the company of prostitutes, and at one point he enters into a 
discussion with less enlightened colleagues about female orgasm. Indeed, having 
fun with less than reputable women was perfectly acceptable behaviour for 
young men in those days — maybe this is why absolutely no reminiscences of 
friends and contemporaries refer to such erotic cscapades in Semmelweis's 
youth. Precisely because it is trivial, the episode does not enrich the portrait of 
the protagonist. 
Though naive and biassed, Bj0meboe's play is anything but boring. 
Unfortunately, references to the development of Semmelweis's ideas occasionally 
serve to confuse the reader. First Semmelweis calls childbed fever an epidemic, 
then discovers that it is endemic. He makes hand washing with water and soap 
obligatory for interns; later he insists on the use of lime. Imprecisions are 
frequent: Bj0rneboe once identifies 1850, another time (correctly) 1848 as the 
year of European revolutions. Also, Semmelweis once appears in revolutionary 
uniform, when it is well known that he stayed aloof from the revolution/ We 
also hear the "dual monarchy" mentioned. Bj0rneboe shares several misconcep-
tions with Sackler, such as the myth that Semmelweis died of an infected sore 
on his hand, and, less importantly, both believe that the capital of Hungary in 
1850 was Budapest. 
Yet another Semmelweis emerges from Howard Sackler 's (1929-1982) 
portrayal.9 (Pondering this author's last name makes us wonder whether he had 
Hungarian ancestry.) Sackler wrote plays, television plays, and film scripts. His 
placement of Semmelweis in the development of medical science is interesting. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, this science was just shedding its inhibitions. 
Among these were a fixation with diagnostics, skepticism about the possibility of 
prevention, and an early Darwinist-positivist determinism. A typical manifesta-
tion of this attitude was the mania to dissect. Thus, Semmelweis was ahead of 
his time in his ambition to prevent sepsis. Sackler mentions that not only the 
bacteria on the exposed and unwashed hands of the medics but also on the 
medical instruments, blankets, and sheets could cause sepsis. Much less than in 
Bj0rneboe, there is a reference to the impurity of science, to social contamination 
by ambition and envy. Sackler also refers to the forging of statistics (which we 
all know well), and the claiming of other people's achievements as our own. 
In Sackler's drama there is just a short reference to Semmelweis's 
premarital experience with women, in the form of a passing flirt with a nurse. 
Otherwise we learn that he lived with his widowed sister and married a well-
heeled girl from Ischl. In this play Semmelweis never leaves Austria: fifteen 
years of his life in Pest are cut out. No reference is made to the revolution 
which, actually, had an important impact on academic freedom and, therefore, 
did influence Semmelweis's career indirectly. The hero's family name is 
misspelled, with a double "s" at the end, and everybody calls him by his infre-
quently used middle name, Philip — probably because "Ignatius" is unfamiliar to 
speakers of English. There are also other errors and improbabilities in the play, 
just some of which have been mentioned. 
Sackler's piece was first staged in Buffalo in 1977, and then 111 two other 
American cities, everywhere unnoticed. In 1987 the Equity Showcase Theatre 
staged Semmelweiss at Toronto's Harbourfront. This performance received 
laudatory reviews, which surprises one who did not see it, but has only read the 
play. The cast is large: thirty-seven persons, and there is much idling in the 
lengthy piece. Especially the directing and the performaces of some of the lead 
actors were appreciated by critics. 
Gyorgy Szaraz's play Gyilkosok (Murderers)10 won the 1980 Agria prize 
and was staged thai same summer in Eger, site of the Agria festivals. Szaraz 
(1930-1987) was an enigmatic figure in the last decade of the Kadar regime. He 
was imprisoned during the rule of Matyas Rakosi and subsequently held modest 
cultural positions. In 1977 he became column editor of the cultural weekly Elet 
es Irodalom and in 1983 editor of the literary monthly Kortdrs. While he 
published nothing of importance until 1976, in the last decade of his life he 
ground out eight volumes. Obviously, Szaraz became a protege of the cultural 
dictator Gyorgy Aczel, taking responsibility for publications about sensitive 
subjects that the regime wanted to vent unofficially. In such capacity Szaraz 
wrote a polemic pamphlet against Romanian chauvinism," and a long eulogy for 
the sadistic traitor Palffy-Oesterreicher.12 
Agents entrusted with such sensitive propaganda tasks naturally enjoyed 
certain liberties, as will be pointed out. At first reading, Szaraz's play strikes 
one as the best researched and historically most authentic of the three. He 
doesn't kill off Semmelwcis at the end but finishes the play with the hero 's 
decision to return to his native country. There is no reference to Semmelweis's 
private life, and the hero's non-participation in the 1848 revolution is made 
explicit. The play is so balanced and smoothly flowing, it is almost manneristic 
— something that reviewers pointed out. With its moral message it reminds one 
of Laszlo Nemeth's psychological morality plays. 
A Hungarian reader or spectator may discover an underlying message, 
however. Hungarian literature during the Kad&r era developed its own technique 
of double talk (now fashionably called meta-language). Unlike Bj0rneboe's 
anarchist antics or Sackler's philosophized search for a healing truth, Szaraz 
critically targets a well-defined bureaucratic autocracy of a certain age. Besides 
the untouchable figureheads of the old regime (shall we say, the venerable 
lifelong party comrades?), and, an overall ideological control, truth also gets a 
specific meaning. What if the world realized that obstetricians literally executed 
thousands of women worldwide in their ignorance? Nobody would ever believe 
again in medical science, or — who knows? — perhaps in any authority any 
more! Wc may continue this line of thought. What if the Soviet government 
had acccptcd responsibility for the massacre at Katyn? Not to mention the 
unknown number of its other victims: were they twenty million? Forty million? 
Who would have believed in communism any longer? When Szaraz's Semmel-
weis says; "All of us are murderers," he sounds very different from his Norwe-
gian and American alter egos. Also, Hungarians may have recognized other 
analogies in the play, such as the mention of the reprisals against intellectuals 
who participated in the war of independence in 1848-49. Even more viciously 
persecuted were the participants of the revolution of 1956. 
We have discussed three dramas — similar and yet different as they are. 
We met an erotic anarchist, a philosophical forerunner of democracy who arrived 
too early, and a speaker of the troubled conscience of a distant age — all called 
Semmelweis. Will the real Semmelweis please stand up? Actually, all three 
figures exist equally. We cannot learn much from comparing them, except that 
we know that any literary hero has more to do with the author than the real-life 
model, if there is one. In spite of the glaring errors of the Norwegian and 
American plays, and the artistic mediocrity of all three dramas, all three S tm-
melweises are worthy of consideration. Unfortunately language barriers and the 
absence of translations make it virtually impossible to do so for someone who 
does not read all three languages. 
As a postscript, wc may add yet another title to the list of literary works 
inspired by the life of Ignac Semmelweis. In 1924 a medical student by the 
name of Louis Destouches submitted a dissertation to the Sorbonnc for which he 
received a doctoral degree.13 Since this slim volume is a rather rambling 
philosophical statement about the grim fate of the genius, presented in an 
emotional, lyrical style and spiked with aphorismatic banalities, one wonders 
what amazing criteria the famous citadel of French scholarship had in those days 
to grant somebody a doctoral degree in medical history. Besides the definitely 
unscholarly presentation, the dissertation also contained numerous inaccuracies, 
for instance, the often-heard myth that Semmelweis was still dissecting in spite 
of his mentally unstable condition, when he acquired the fatal sepsis from a self-
inflicted wound to his finger.14 There arc also anachronisms in the book that 
serve as literary embellishments. Wc learn that the little Ignac visited his 
parents on Sundays by crossing the Danube on a beautiful bridge.15 The same 
little Ignac liked to play on the street, because streets in Hungary are full of 
music and song.16 
Obviously, the author knew nothing about Pest-Buda, nor would he ever 
in his life see Budapest. This did not keep him from becoming world famous 
under the assumed name Louis-Ferdinand Celine. Like Semmelweis, Celine too 
was a difficult and controversial figure, among other things as a supporter of 
Marshal Pelain. If his books prove anything, it is the curious interrelation 
between author and work. The Semmelweis Celine described was himself: a 
misunderstood, brooding, then raging misanthrope. The misunderstood genius 
was one of his recurring literary figures. For this reason, Celine's 1932 novel 
about a suburban physician, titled Voyage au bout de la nutt does not seem 
directly related to the real Semmelweis. 
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No event in modern history affected Hungarians as much as the Treaty of 
Trianon (1920), which reduced the country to a fraction of its former self and 
cut the Magyar nation into five unequal parts. The impact of Trianon can only 
be compared to that of the Battle of Mohacs (1526) and Hungary's subsequent 
trisection, which made the country into the battleground of two empires for two 
centuries, and also sowed the seeds of the nation's modern-day decline. 
Hungary's dismemberment left a deep impact upon virtually every 
segment of the Hungarian nation, be these in the truncated country, in the 
detached territories, or in the immigrant communities abroad.1 During the 
interwar years, they all suffered from what came to be known as the Trianon 
syndrome, and they all devoted most of their political efforts propagandizing 
against this unjust treaty and seeking support for the cause of Hungarian revi-
sionism. 
The nature and magnitude of the psychological shock upon the Hungarian 
mind was perhaps best expressed by Gyula Szekfu (1885-1955), the pre-eminent 
historian of the interwar years who, in his Hdrom nemzedek [Three Generations], 
gave vent to his feelings as follows: "This book is my personal experience.... I 
felt... I would never be able to recovcr my strength and my will to work until 
having taken account of the decline that had lead us to this disaster. 1 simply 
had to face up to the forces that have dragged my nation out of a stream of 
healthy evolution. Thus did I come to write this book and... thus did I redeem 
my soul."2 
Szekfu's views were echoed by all segments of Hungarian society: 
Politicians and poets, scientists and historians, bureaucrats and artisans, landless 
peasants and landed aristocrats, right-leaning gentry and left-leaning intellectuals, 
avant-garde artists and conservative military men. The Trianon shock embraced 
the whole nation, and it became a lasting national malady that has ravaged the 
minds and hearts of all Hungarians ever since that time, notwithstanding the fact 
that during the four decades of communist rule Trianon became a national 
taboo.1 
That this was the case is best demonstrated by the rumblings in Hungar-
ian intellectual circles sincc the early 1980s when, for the first time in many 
years, some dared to talk about Trianon and the psychological dislocations it has 
caused.4 This daring defiance, by the way, was the result of the growing 
concern for the welfare of the Hungarian minorities beyond the Trianon frontiers, 
who were being subjected to increasing pressures of denationalization. One of 
the best expressions of this conccrn was Peter Hanak's article in the Elet es 
Irodalom [Life and Literature], where he pointed out the fact that the Hungarians 
have never been able to digest Trianon: "The trauma of defeat was so terribly 
deep, and it shook the nation's life-foundations to such a degree that for years 
and even decades we could hardly expect anyone... to come up with its objective 
assessment.... Trianon prevented us from recognizing the relativity of our place 
and role in the world, and the necessity of establishing good relations with the 
Danubian peoples."5 
Given the above, the early reaction to Trianon included the foundation of 
a whole set of anti-Trianon organizations, the initiation of an all-embracing 
revisionist movement, the enlistment of the country's historians and scholarly 
institutions to justify revisionism form a historical, economic and geographical 
point of view, and the search for alliances among such equally revisionist 
European great powers as Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. 
While this unified national effort in favour of a policy of revisionism did 
result in some ethnically-linguistically justifiable territorial revisions between 
1938 and 1941, Hungary's unfortunate involvement in World War II on the Axis 
side undid all of those gains. Moreover, in light of the country's Soviet occupa-
tion and communist control between 1945 and 1990, the whole Trianon question 
was placed on ice. However keenly felt by all Hungarians, for at least three of 
the four decades of Soviet-communist rule, it was impossible to speak about the 
injustices of Trianon. Nor was it possible to raise the problem of the Hungarian 
minorities in the neighbouring states, without being accused of chauvinism. 
The Re-Emergence of the Trianon Question 
The situation changed gradually during the 1980s, when the Treaty of Trianon 
and its impact were beginning to be treated by serious historians;6 and then very 
suddenly after the fall of communism, when the floodgates of the freedom of 
expression were suddenly thrown wide open. The result was the appearance of a 
whole series of Trianon-related works. Many of these are of little scholarly 
value, but they gave vent to the frustration that had accumulated during the 
decades of enforced silence. 
Naturally, there are many exceptions among these emotion-filled post-
communist publications. Some of them are respectable and well-researched 
monographs, like those by Jozsef Galantai and Jeno Gergely of the University of 
Budapest,7 while others are sections of comprehensive syntheses produced by 
post-communist Hungarian historiography. The two best examples of the latter 
were prepared as university textbooks. They include Zsuzsa L. Nagy's synthesis 
of interwar Hungarian history written for use at The Kossuth University of 
Debrecen,8 and the multi-authored history of twentieth-century Hungary prepared 
under the direction of Ferenc Poloskei for the Eotvos University of Budapest.9 
L. Nagy devotes about six of her 266 pages (pp. 88-94) to the discussion of 
Trianon and its consequences; while the Poldskei-editcd volume covers the same 
topic in five of its 267 comparable pages, i.e., in its coverage of Hungarian 
history up to the year 1945. Both of these are detached summaries of historic 
Hungary's mutilation, but both of them also point to the peacemakers' violation 
of the principle of national self-determination that brought about the country's 
dismemberment and then resulted in the creation of several small, almost equally 
multinational states around Hungary. The authors of these works also emphasize 
the psychological pain produced by Trianon for several generations of Hungari-
ans, most of whom were unable to reconcile themselves to the new realities, and 
were searching fervently for ways to undo the effects of Trianon. 
It should be pointed out in this conncction that these historical syntheses, 
as well as virtually all other books dealing with modern Hungary's historical 
development, have reverted to the use of traditional Hungarian names for places 
and regions located in the detached territories. This custom, a standard practice 
in interwar Hungary, had been abandoned by Marxist historiography in the late 
1940s and early 1950s — although without affecting significantly their use in 
everyday conversation. A return to the use of traditional place names had already 
begun during the 1980s. The full impact of this trend, however, could not be felt 
until after the fall of communism. This trend also produced a number of geo-
graphical dictionaries that supply the original Hungarian and/or German version 
of many thousands of place names that have been altered following the transfer 
of these territories from under Hungarian to Austrian (1920), Czechoslovak 
(1920), Polish (1920), Romanian (1920 and 1945), Soviet (1945), Yugoslav 
(1920 and 1945), Ukrainian (1991). or Slovak (1993) sovereignty.10 This, in 
turn, revived their use even among those members of the younger generations, 
who by virtue of their age had no direct links with the lost territories. 
The Question of Frontier Revisions 
Notwithstanding the mass of emotional outpourings that followed the collapse of 
communism, and in spite of the ever more difficult situation faced by the 
Hungarian minorities in £eau§escu's and Iliescu's Romania, and in Meciar's 
Slovakia, none of Hungary's post-communist governments came out in favour of 
frontier revisions. True, these governments did stress the need for improved 
human rights for the Hungarian minorities, but in emphasizing human rights the 
Hungarian authorities marched hand in hand with the United States and all other 
major West European states. It seems therefore, that the various post-communist 
Hungarian governments were fully aware that Hungary's prospective membership 
in the NATO and in the European Economic Community [EEC] is predicated 
upon their acceptance of the status quo with respect to the frontiers. 
This policy of keeping quite about frontier revisions and stressing the 
need for improved human rights has also been followed by most of Hungary's 
important civic organizations, including the Hungarian World Federation, which, 
at times, has been accused of being too nationalistic. Yet when, on the occasion 
of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, the Federation orga-
nized a three-day conference, it turned out to be a detached assessment of the 
situation, with papers being presented by a number of respected Hungarian and 
Western scholars.'1 
Of the many recent publications concerning Trianon, the most talked-
about is the one written by Erno Raffay, a founding member of the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum [Magyar Demokrata Forum], who had also served as a 
member of the parliament (1989-94) and as the Vice-President of the National 
Defense Council (1990-93) during Hungary's first post-communist government. 
Entitled Magyar tragedia [Hungarian Tragedy],12 this work combines elements of 
professional historical scholarship with a degree of emotionalism that appeals to 
the common reader. The author broaches the question of frontier revisions, but 
he recognizes that the possibilities for such revisions are very remote and 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
In a later study prepared for a Hungarian-American audience, however, 
Raffay comes out clearly in favour of frontier revisions based on the principle of 
national self-determination. He does this in conjunction with his analysis of 
Hungarian party politics in the mid-1990s: "The border question is the fulcrum 
of today 's politics: The political parties thai subscribe to the changeability of 
Hungary's Trianon frontiers stand for Hungarian national interests. Those that do 
not subscribe to this view, on the other hand, do not represent national interests, 
and as such arc not within the ranks of patriotic parties."'1 
The Growth of Pragmatism 
Raffay's book elicited sufficient reaction for a spccial conference to be organized 
by the Hungarian World Federation on January 15, 1996.14 The conference was 
attended by a great number of intellectuals, thirty-two of whom made an effort 
to comment on Raffay's book and on the whole question of revisionism. Their 
ranks included scholars, writers, politicians, and various other public personali-
ties, a number of them from the Western World. They all agreed that the Treaty 
of Trianon was an intensely unfair and unjust arrangement, that the Hungarian 
minorities in the neighbouring states are being subjected to various degrees of 
denationalization, and that the impact of Trianon was so thorough that it left a 
permanent scar upon the Hungarian mind, but they could not agree on the 
question of revisionism. The majority of them, however, felt that it would be 
unwise to broach this question at this time, even though this frontier rectification 
would only be based on ethnic-linguistic considerations. They also agreed that 
they should concentrate on demanding improved human and collective rights for 
the Hungarians on the other side of the frontiers, and that frontier revisions 
would have to be left to a hoped-for better future. One of them, Gyula Borbandi, 
a noted scholar of the history of the Hungarians in the West, closed the argu-
ment with the well-known French proverb: "Jamais y parler, toujours y penser,"15 
One of the recent results of this reemerging Trianon syndrome is the 
establishment of a Trianon Association in 1997, whose goals included "the 
international reexamination of the peace-Diktats," aiding the preservation of the 
Magyar language and culture in the detached territories, and furthering the 
introduction of autonomy for the Hungarian minorities in the succession states.16 
The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon also resulted in the 
publication of a special edition of the highly respected popular periodical 
Historia, founded and edited by one of Hungary's most gifted historians, Ferenc 
Glatz, in which twelve scholars examined the whole Trianon question. All of the 
enclosed studies are the products of detached historical analysis and political 
pragmatism, and their authors all seem to agree with Glatz's conclusions to the 
effect that the answer to Trianon is not revisionism, but the 
sober appreciation... of the grievances rising on both sides 
of the frontiers [and at the same time] the tolerant mutual 
appreciation [of the pain] of all Hungarians, Romanians, 
Slovaks, South Slavs, Germans, Gypsies, and Jews who 
identify themselves as a separate nationality. It must be 
acknowledged that the national minority question is not 
simply the questions of Hungarians across our frontiers. It is 
rather a universal question in our region.... The people of 
Central Europe have to stop the hysteria of national victim-
ization, where everyone — Hungarians, Romanians, Slo-
vaks, Serbians, and Croatians — view themselves as victims 
of history.17 
This kind of pragmatic view is also evident among the younger, Western 
education members of the immigrant elite, although many of their elders still 
cling to the idea of traditional revisionism. These Western educated intellectuals 
generally accept the geographical status quo, but they too view the current 
treatment of the Hungarian minorities — especially in Meciar's Slovakia and 
prc-Constantinescu Romania — as an unacceptable violation of treaty obligations 
and of basic human rights. They generally favour the membership of these 
former Soviet satellites in the NATO and the EEC, because they believe that 
their joining or rejoining Western European civilization will oblige them to 
accept the Western mode of behaviour toward their national minorities. These 
pragmatic professionals also hope that the expansion of the EEC into Central and 
Southeastern Europe will result in the rapid "spiritualization" of frontiers, and 
thus in elimination of the artificial boundaries between the various Hungarian 
communities in the Carpathian Basin.1R 
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The Intelligentsia in Hungary 
prior to World War I 
Janos Mazsu 
The word "intelligentsia" is one of those terms used in historical and soci-
ological literature which is most difficult to define. It frequently gives rise to 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation.1 I will therefore begin with a few 
general words on the subject by way of clarifying my use of the concept. I wili 
restrict this introduction to the questions: When did the term first appear, and 
where? 
Despite its widespread usage, the term is of fairly recent origin. Before 
the nineteenth century there were references to "scribes" or "learned individuals" 
who earned a living in various countries from their knowledge of reading and 
writing: philosophers, lawyers or poets; but these people consistently referred to 
each other by these names, and never as "the intelligentsia." 
When the Latin word "intelligentes" appeared in use before the last 
century, it was a philosophical term used to denote the level of cognition and 
degree of comprehension. Only in the early nineteenth century we do see the 
word used to refer to a special social group.2 Nevertheless in recent times the 
term of "intelligentsia" has been freely used by sociologists and social historians 
with reference to Greek teacher slaves in ancient Rome, Chinese mandarins, the 
thinkers of the Enlightenment, or even to members of contemporary bureaucra-
cies. While the social historian should bear this conceptual similarity in mind, he 
or she should not disregard the differences between the social and cultural 
backgrounds of these thinkers; and the difference between the status of a teacher-
slave in ancient Rome and that of a mandarin in ancient China must have been 
enormous.3 
A second point to be stressed in this introduction is that "the intelligen-
tsia," where the term came into use, designated a special, distinct group in 
society, i.e. one clearly requiring its own label. Thus the intelligentsia must be 
clearly distinguished from the intellectuals, a term used in nearly all industrially 
developed or developing countries to designate people with education but 
without commensurate economic or even social status.4 
It may seem odd that the term intelligentia first appeared in Central and 
Eastern Europe, a comparatively peripheral and underdeveloped part of nine-
teenth century Europe. Historians have debated for more than a decadc whether 
the term arose first in Russia, Germany, Poland, or some other region in this part 
of Europe. Russian historians argue that it was coined by a Russian writer at 
mid-century, but cannot agree whether he was Peter Boborykin or Vissarion 
Belinskii. A Polish historian, Waclaw Lednicki, has shown that the term bccamc 
current nearly the same time in Poland. He concluded that these countries were 
the birthplace of this social group and the term first surfaced in East European 
languages. German historians, however, have found German texts using the word 
Intelligenz as early as 1849 to describe the same phenomenon, namely a group 
distinguished from the rest of society by its education, social character, and 
mentality. A synonymous term was Bildungshurgertum.5 Hungary's leading 
political thinker of the 1840s and later revolutionary statesman Lajos Kossuth 
also used the term "intelligentsia" — and its synonyms ertelmiseg and hono-
red iors — as a designation for a social group, in his newspaper Pesti Hirlap at 
the beginning of the 1840s.6 
Philological investigators will no doubt unearth further information on 
this question. This paper is concerned more with the origins of the intelligentsia 
itself. It is generally agreed that a new social stratum emerged in the middle of 
the last century. It was a better educated part of society, distinguished from the 
rest of the upper and middle classes by a characteristic combination of psycho-
logical traits, manners, lifestyle, social status and, especially, a distinct value 
system. The chief source of Western scholar's misunderstandings concerning the 
term is the fact that, in the course of the last century in Western Europe and the 
US, the social stratum known by this name did not emerge. There were, of 
course, professional and clcricai workers in the middle and upper bourgeois 
classes of contemporary western societies as well, but these never became a 
social stratum with an independent role and group consciousness. Western 
scholars often misinterpret "the intelligentsia" to mean "the intellectuals." To 
cite Hugh Seton-Watson's definition of intellectuals: "In western societies the 
word is used mainly to denote a small inner elite or self-styled elite of writers 
and cultural dignitaries" — and not a larger social stratum. Misunderstandings 
concerning the intelligentsia in the West seem to have arisen after the October 
Revolution in Russia, when a large number of emigres, former members of the 
Russian intelligentsia employed the term, although it lacked real meaning in the 
West.7 
The questions might be asked what characteristics of Central and East 
European sociai development explain its significant divergence from that of the 
West, and what factors account for the emergence of the intelligentsia in a 
region that was less developed? To answer these questions we have to empha-
size the historical peculiarities of Central and Eastern Europe: 
1. These were feudal agrarian societies that underwent a dramatically 
rapid industrialization.8 
2. Therefore, in a longer process the feudal structure of these "societies of 
orders or estates" was not demolished as it had been in the West. Rather, the 
estates, group relationships, values and ruling institutions were incorporated with 
little changc into the newly emerging elements of these societies. 
3. The chief organizing and integrating mechanism of these industrializ-
ing societies was not a developed market, but a neo-absolutist political system. 
These societies developed their own constituent institutions to further — and, at 
the same, time — control economic processes. The over-bloated bureaucracy of 
these neo-absolutist states not only supplanted the rudimentary market system, 
but required many wcll-educated people whom it organized and attached to these 
institutions, assisting in the birth of a distinctive corporate spirit. 
4. The modernization of Central and Eastern Europe in the half century 
before World War I took place in largely illiterate societies. From Germany to 
Russia, fifty to ninety percent of the population could neither read nor write at 
the beginning of this period.9 Consequently the quickly emerging bureaucratic 
stratum of each society becamc separated from uneducated classes and strata by 
its own education. It is no accident that the intelligentsia, dependent on the state 
and culturally different from other groups, developed a distinct class conscious-
ness. It considered itself to be socially unattached or free-floating, in Alfred 
Weber's original phrase, die freischwebende Intelligenz.l0 
The classic gymnasium-type secondary education fostered and preserved 
the social and cultural homogeneity of the intelligentsia since all members of the 
stratum passed through it. Alexander Hertz wrote: 
The high school diploma (Reifezeugnis, Matura) did not have the 
same meaning for a member of the intelligentsia as it did for an 
educated man in the West. It gave a man not only the right to 
practice a profession, but bestowed a title or dignity that would 
remain forever with its bearer, membership in a privileged stra-
tum. But wc can state that in neither the United States nor in 
other Western countries did education provide as much social 
distinction as did personal success, wealth even birth. In these 
countries a collegc graduate might be a member of an intellectual 
group, faculty, learned society, professional association, the bar, 
etc. — but his education by no means caused him to regard 
himself as the member of a distinct social class. He generally 
defined his status as bourgeois middle class." 
Secondary and higher education became one of the most important 
sources of stratification in Central and East European societies. A high school 
diploma — and, especially, a college degree — practically replaced the former 
letters patent of nobility and the privilege of birth. 
5. It is also important to note that the half-century of industrialization in 
this region was also the period in which linguistic national communities took 
shape.IJ The intelligentsia of these comparatively backward, illiterate societies 
becamc the architcct of national ideology, culture and, indeed, of future leader-
ship. The undemocratic system of governing institutions reinforced the so-called 
national mission of the intelligentsia. Eventually, with the exception of Russia, 
the region adopted the idea and practice of western constitutionalism, but only in 
a forma! sense: institutions enjoyed genuine prerogatives but they had strictly 
limited powers. (Russia did not even go this far before World War 1). In place of 
the self-government of socicty characteristic of the West, we see in Central and 
Eastern Europe the hierarchical collaboration of a narrow, partly traditional 
governing elite of noble origin and a skilled, burcaucratized intelligentsia. The 
undemocratic state, then, was an important factor in the development of the 
distinctive social profile, mentality and class consciousness of the intelligentsia. 
To be sure, my brief survey has disregarded the distinguishing character-
istics of national variants. The expert modern German Beamtenintelligenz of the 
turn of the century, the descendant of the Bildungshurgertum so well analyzed 
by Max Weber, was a barely recognizable relative of the Russian intelligentsia. 
The latter constituted an estate of the service nobility and a smaller number of 
so-called revolutionary intellectuals who hailed from similar social backgrounds. 
To summarize: 1 use the term "intelligentsia" to denote the spccial social 
strata shaped by the processes of industrialization and bureaucratic moderniza-
tion, as well as that of the birth of nations and nation stales in Central and East 
Europe. 
This introduction sought to clarify the term; the section that follows will 
point out the special features of one variant, the Hungarian intelligentsia. 
The social origins and transformation of the Hungarian intelligentsia 
1) General analysis: demographic growth and occupational change 
This investigation utilized the census reports of the Royal Hungarian Statistical 
Bureau (Magyar Kirdlyi Statisztikai Hivatal). The bureau was founded at the end 
of the 1860s and its first census of the entire population was taken in 1869. 
Thereafter the census was taken at ten-year intervals, producing the main source 
of research in social history. The two official censuses of the Imperial Austrian 
Statistical Bureau in 1850 and 1857 were only moderately successful because of 
the resistance of the Hungarian population. The basis for comparison of the 
period before 1848-49 are partial figures, nonofficial censuses, and calculations.13 
(See tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1. Growth of the Hungarian intelligentsia before World War I 
Year Number 
1800 20,000 
1810 25,000 
1820 30,000 
1830 38,000 
1840 45,000 
1850 66,000 
1860 90,000 
1870 137,965 
1880 150,000 
1890 172,636 
1900 230,162 
1910 311,260 
Table 2. The occupational make-up of the Hungarian intelligentsia (in percen-
tages). 
1800 1840s 1870 1890 1910 
Clerks in business 2 1.51 19.64 24.24 37.22 
Doctors, lawyers 5 13.21 8.83 11.24 11.26 
Farm managers 10 15.15 11.64 7.38 3.97 
Teachers 4 15.15 19.73 21.51 19.54 
Civil servants 4 24.24 25.76 23.19 20.50 
Clergy 75 31.34 14.40 12.44 7.51 
At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were approxi-
mately 20,000 persons employed in intellectual functions in Hungary. In conse-
quence of the feudal, underdeveloped character of society three-fourths of them 
belonged to the clergy of the different churches. Only about 5,000 worked in 
secular fields as lawyers, civil servants of cities (exempt from seigniorial juris-
diction), teachers, artists, writers, poets, many of them employed by larger 
landowners or aristocratic families as members of their personal staff. I do not 
consider these groups to constitute a social stratum. Clergymen were members of 
privileged feudal institutions, and lawyers generally came from and belonged to 
the nobility. Employees of the aristocratic families had the same social and legal 
status as other personal servants. (The life of the outstanding Hungarian poet, 
Mihaly Vitez Csokonai, is very instructive in this regard.)14 
The numerical growth of the group of educated people performing 
functions of an intellectual nature accelerated in the first half of ihe nineteenth 
century. It constituted the first, weak response of the Hungarian economy to the 
external challenge: the transformation of the world economic system and the 
emergence of the industrial revolution reached the western parts of the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the late 1830s. Production rapidly increased in Hungary in these 
decadcs, despite several years of stagnation and a genera! crisis of agrarian 
commodity production. In the 1840s, the first truly modern factories appeared.1" 
The response of a society of feudal estates to this transformation was 
multi-faceted. First of all, as a result of these changes, the secularization of 
society accelerated. Members of the clergy performed more and more non-religi-
ous functions, such as teaching, medical care and engineering. Outside the 
clergy, professional activities were increasingly in the hands of institutions other 
than the churches and traditional medieval cultural organizations. Furthermore, 
the country's labour force became increasingly professionalised. For the groups 
performing intellectual functions, this meant that the paid civil servant sup-
planted the so-called nobile ojficium in the administration, even in the traditional 
county administration directed by the nobility. At the same time the emergence 
of book publishing and of the daily press — and the growth of the urban reading 
public — brought about the proliferation of journalists, writers, actors and even 
poets. The urban publishing industry enabled professionals in the service of the 
nobility to rise above the level of personal servants.16 Still another result of 
professionalization was the appearance of highly-skilled farm managers (gazda-
tisztek). They assisted in the modernization of many large estates and the 
adoption of western methods of rational agricultural management. 
These developments altered the number and occupational composition of 
the social group. The assemblage of data from varying sources indicates that 
from the turn of the century to the 1840s the number of professionals grew to 
about 66,000. The proportion of the clergy dramatically decreased from 75% to 
less than one third, while the percentage of civil servants increased to one fourth 
of all professionals. Elementary and secondary school teachers and farm 
managers totalled about one sixth of the group, while lawyers, doctors, writers, 
poets were less than one seventh. The engineer and white collar contingent of 
the modern economic sectors was only one and one half percent. 
The rapidly growing professional groups found their place in feudal 
society in a special but characteristic way. In earlier times, the landowning 
nobility had administered the feudal constitutional system and members of the 
lower nobility as well as aristocracy had played an important role in the develop-
ment of Hungarian culture and political theory. Beginning in the 1830s the 
growing professional groups, of varying social and ethnic origin but chiefly non-
privileged, themselves constituted a sort of feudal corporation or estate. They 
were labelled honoratiors, which meant an estate of people who enjoyed great 
respect despite their non-noble origin. Their social status gradually improved 
until it approached that of the lesser nobility. For instance, at the beginning of 
the 1840s the honoratiors gained the right to vote. Until then this had been the 
privilege of the nobility which it jealously guarded.17 
At first the coalescence of the professionals in Hungarian society came 
about as a result of their being different from the non-privileged classcs. Soon 
they assumed the privileged estates' values, acquired social prestige, and devel-
oped their own group consciousness. This development was temporarily obscured 
by the collaboration between the honoratiors and the well-educated reformist 
segment of the Hungarian nobility. Their movement for radical social and 
economic change led to the Hungarian revolution of 1848. After the revolution's 
collapse, the intelligentsia continued to belong to a privileged part of society. 
The mid-nineteenth century was a turning point in the development of 
Hungarian society and in that of the intelligentsia. Although the revolution was 
defeated, feudal barriers were largely abolished, opening the way to economic 
and social modernization.18 Not surprisingly, the ranks of the Hungarian intelli-
gentsia grew rapidly in the two decades leading up to the Compromise of 1867. 
The number of people in intellectual functions doubled. An analysis of the 
professional structure indicates the increase occurred chiefly in the new state 
administration, the accelerated market economy and the increased demand for 
trained personnel. The number of civil servants increased by 222 % in twenty 
years, educational personnel grew by 270 %, and the percentage of clerks 
employed in the industry, finance and commerce rose from one and one half 
percent to one fifth of all professionals. 
The withdrawal of the better-educated landowning nobility from political 
and public activity during this period of Habsburg neo-absolutism also helped the 
intelligentsia to solidify its status in society. It was in this period that profes-
sionals began, for the first time, to organize for their own protection, thereby 
taking an important step toward becoming a proper social stratum or macrogroup 
within Hungarian society. 
The Compromise of 1867 restored the hegemony of the traditional 
Hungarian ruling classes. The stabilization of the political situation and the 
reorganization of the imperial market created a framework for the long-term 
development of both the economy and the society. In the decades following, the 
Hungarian nobility's traditional values, way of life, and loyalty to the governing 
elite, became the decisive orientation for the intelligentsia. These considerations 
once again overshadowed the factor of professional competence which had been 
dominant during the preceding age of absolutism. 
* * * 
In analyzing the post-Compromise period, I was forced to take a longer perspec-
tive utilizing data f rom the 1890 census. (The Hungarian census of 1880 cannot 
be used due to its defective methodology.) Fortunately for our purpose, the 
period from the Compromise to 1890, including the 1873 economic crisis itself, 
was one of continuous preparation for the industrial revolution, mainly in 
building up a national infrastructure. 
The figures show that the rate of the growth in the numbers of profes-
sionals slowed during these two decades in comparison with the previous two. 
Total population growth and the transformation of the labour force also stag-
nated. All these factors had important implications for the development of the 
intelligentsia. 
The most important cause of this slowdown was the economic crisis of 
1873 itself: after four years of prosperity, the Hungarian economy was shaken 
and entered a period of stagnation. Another important cause was a famine and 
epidemic of medieval proportions, responsible for more than one quarter million 
deaths. But non-quantitative processes originating in the previous decades 
deepened in this period. They had the following consequences for the intelligen-
tsia: 
1) The tendency of professional groups to form into a stratum became 
strong. Intellectual employees involved in modernization were not absorbed by a 
modern bourgeoisie, but look the position of the declassed lower nobility. The 
intelligentsia emerged as a modern post-feudal estate. 
It is significant that the intelligentsia acquired the label "educated middle 
class of gentlemen" or "gentlemen's estate" (in Hungarian: "uri es muvelt 
kozeposztaly" or "az uri rend"). So it is not surprising that the label "bourgeois" 
became an indication of contempt. 
2) Tn this period the so-called free professionals (szabad foglalkozasu 
ertelmiseg), self-employed and running independent enterprises, became a 
relatively large group. Their growth was a product of urbanization: a larger 
urban petty bourgeoisie appeared which had its own needs and means. But the 
group's limited potential for further growth is seen in the fact that real profes-
sionals, similar to their western counterparts, were never as many as one-tenth of 
the entire intelligentsia during the dualist period. Thus the clerical intellectual 
(tisztviselo ertelmisegi) remained the dominant category of the intelligentsia. 
3) An educational system that was comparable to the best in Europe 
developed at this time. Not only did it train white-collar workers needed for 
modernization but it also produced world-famous specialists (Janos Neumann, 
Bcla Bartok, Zoltan Kodaly, Lipot Fcjcr, Gyorgy Czukor, etc.). Having an 
education, furthermore, superseded rank acquired through birth as a determinant 
of social status and legitimation. A law passed in 1883 specified the educational 
requirements for all professions, even for civil servants. It was also instrumental 
in the formation of the educated middlc-class of gentlemen. 
A term entered Hungarian usage in these decades which acquired a 
different meaning from that in the West: the gentry. Tri Hungary it denoted the 
declassed, impoverished segment of the previous landowning nobility which 
sought to maintain its social status and reputation by capturing positions in the 
state administration. This civil service gentry of noble origin became an interme-
diary between the nobility and the new middle class.115 
The numerical growth of the intelligentsia accelerated once again in the 
late 1880s. Economic modernization reached a new stage with the beginning of 
a proper industrial revolution in Hungary itself. From 1890 to 1910 (the last 
census taken in the Dual Monarchy) the number of professionals increased from 
172,000 to more than 311,000. Clerical personnel in industry, commerce and 
transport were the most dynamic element. By 1910 they accounted for more than 
a third of the intelligentsia; the percentage of the clergy, on the other hand, had 
decreased to less than 8%. Academic employees also showed above-average 
growth: modern scholarly institutions were established and expanded at this time. 
Hungary began experiencing a deepening societal crisis at the beginning 
of the new century, due largely to the country's very rapid industrialization but 
also to its unbalanced development. The urgency of the national minorities 
problem, the growing need for agrarian reform, and the demand for democratic 
government, all had serious implications for the intelligentsia: 
1) Hungary's national minorities had developed their own intelligentsia by 
the beginning of the twentieth century. The composition of these intelligentsias 
however, was lopsided: they consisted chiefly of clergymen and elementary 
school teachers. Yet these intelligentsias took increasingly radical positions 
concerning the national question, at times even demanded separation from 
Hungary. Their political ideology and methods were sometimes more radical 
than those of their co-nationals beyond Hungary's borders. Many minority 
leaders began to believe that only a new national state could provide them with 
appropriate roles. 
2) This crisis, tension and the consequent polarization of society led to a 
chasm within the Hungarian intelligentsia. Some members of this educated 
middle class of gentlemen began enjoying good relations with the formerly 
despised, urban, industrial bourgeoisie. They were increasingly benefiting 
economically from industrialization, and their employment became more closely 
connected to the market than to the state. 
3) The Hungarian intelligentsia was polarized not only in terms of its 
social position and attitudes, but also with respect to its cultural and political 
outlook. In the years preceding World War I, it divided into two large factions. 
One group was conservative, radical-nationalist, and to some extent anti-Semitic. 
It sought a way out of the general crisis through calling for a radical, social 
transformation of society, and the creation of a powerful state based on so-called 
"national, Christian" principles. The other group consisted of the liberal or 
radical bourgeois part of the Hungarian intelligentsia. It developed an opposi-
tional culture — European and democratic in nature — and sought to transform 
the Hungarian economy and society on the Western European model. 
One more aspect of the development of the Hungarian intelligentsia must 
be mentioned: its geographic distribution. The concentration of the intelligentsia 
in the cities and larger towns had started in the late 1830s and dramatically 
accelcrated as the result of the industrial revolution from the 1880s on. In the 
final decade of the dualist period more than two-thirds of professionals lived in 
cities, where only one-fourth of the general population resided. Budapest alone, 
was the home of one-fourth of intellectual workers; but half of all writers, 
scholars, engineers, and clerical personnel in industry and commerce found their 
livelihood and residence in the capital.20 
To summarize this section: the intellectual social stratum of Hungarian 
society experienced a dramatic and rapid development during the period under 
consideration. From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of 
World War I, its size grew fifteen fold. At the beginning of the period its 
members were chicfly clergymen and other intellectuals living in villages, then 
this stratum took the form a feudal cast, then — with the abolition of feudal 
conditions — it became, in the sense of Max Weber, an estate based on a way of 
life. This "educated middle class of gentlemen" was the creator of modern 
Hungarian national culture and proponent of a national state which in part 
precluded genuine self-government. Its position was transformed by the industrial 
revolution and it became socially and mentally polarized. 
2. Social mobility of the Hungarian intelligentsia 
The research for this paper sought answers to two questions: first, what were the 
social origins of the intelligentsia, and how did these origins affect its basic 
characteristics? Second: to what degree did different social classes and strata, 
ethnic and religious communities enjoy a share in educational opportunities? In 
other words, how did the inequality of educational opportunity change under the 
influence of the industrial revolution? 
It is difficult to answer these questions because Hungarian censuses of 
this period did not enumerate the social origins of occupational groups, so they 
do not provide the social status or occupation of people's fathers. The only way 
to determine this was to analyze educational enrollment and reports. These are 
available sporadically from 1850 to 1880, then regularly and nation-wide from 
1880 on. It was fortunate for my research that secondary education in Hungary, 
unlike in Western Europe, rigidly reflected social stratification. Almost all 
secondary school students were trained for professional positions, so school 
statistics provide answers to both our questions.21 
Our sporadic sources for the early period suggest that in the 1840s only 
haif of those in professional positions were of noble origin. The offspring of 
serfs provided large numbers the recruits for the clergy. 
In the next two decades, after the abolition of feudal conditions, the 
children of the traditional urban strata (artisans and petty merchants) becamc the 
leading elements. By 1880 more than two thirds of secondary school students 
from non-intellectual families were of urban middle class origin; the percentage 
of those coming from the agricultural population, both former nobility and 
peasantry, declined to less than one fifth. Children of professionals of the first or 
second generation reached 40 % at the same time. 
Beginning with 1880 social origins can be studied in detail (see tables 3 
and 4). In the course of the industrial revolution the share of traditional urban 
strata of artisans and shopkeepers slowly began to decline as these groups failed 
Table 3. The social and occupational status of the fathers of secondary school 
students in Hungary (expressed in percentages). 
Bourgeoisie Landowners Intelligentsia Others* 
1800 33.39 19.9 40.21 5.91 
1887 33.48 17.79 43.65 5.08 
1890 33.38 17.36 44.81 4.45 
1895 30.09 17.53 43.91 8.47 
1900 29.28 16.31 44.57 9.84 
1908 25.87 15.33 46.94 11.86 
*In 1890 children of industrial workers made up 1.59 % of Hungary's secondary school 
population. By 1895 this proportion had grown to 1.77%, and by 1908, to 2.04. The 
data for the same years for children of agricultural workers is 2.02%, 2.36% and 5.77% 
respectively. 
to play a role in the development of manufacturing industry. The decline of the 
former landowning nobility continued, their children constitute no more than 
7-8% of the student population at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
village peasantry almost disappeared as a recruiting pool for intellectuals. This 
was partly because industrialization generally bypassed the small agrarian 
sectors. In addition, the abolition of feudal society and the modernization process 
eroded the tradition of wealthy aristocratic and landowning families — as well as 
churches and charitable foundations — supporting the education of talented 
children of the lower strata of society. 
A large part of the peasantry could not participate in the expansion of 
agricultural production; as a result, many peasants were unable to finance a good 
education for their children. The population of some agricultural centres (mezo-
vdrosok), such as Debrecen, constitute an exception. 
In the 1890s, the industrial working class emerged as a source of recruits 
for the intelligentsia, just as recruitment from the agricultural class declined. The 
recruitment of students from the independent urban bourgeoisie also declined in 
significance, but a peculiar urban social group made its appearance which was 
important in later periods of Hungarian history: doormen, porters and office and 
military messengers (hdzmesterek and altisztek). There were as many secondary 
school students from among this group as from the working class and nearly as 
many as from the former nobility! This group was hidden in the statistical 
category of "others" at the beginning of the century. 
Tab le 4. The social make-up of the general population and the student popula-
tion of Hungary in 1900 (expressed in percentages). 
Categories General Population Student Population 
Owners of landed estates (latifundia) 0.39 2.4 
Owners of less than 620 acres of land 38.00 13.91 
Entrepreneurs 0.04 3.05 
Petty bourgeoisie 10.9 26.23 
Intelligentsia 4.2 44.57 
Industrial workers 13.4 3.2 
Agricultural workers 26.4 1.61 
Others, including the lumpenprolctariat 4.5 5.3 
The only long-term upward trend was the increasing proportion of intel-
lectuals recruitcd from their own offspring. Even so, children of the intelligentsia 
did not exceed half of all students. This allows us to conclude that, with respect 
to recruitment, the intelligentsia did not become a socially closed stratum in the 
period before the war. 
I explain these findings, in part based on research not presented here, as 
follows: 
1. The growth of the intelligentsia under industrialization was too rapid 
for it to be a closed group. 
2. Reginning in the late 1890s inflation began to erode the standard of 
living of intelligentsia families, as a result, they had fewer and fewer children. 
The decline in standard of living also meant that one-fourth of the group was 
unable to finance advanced education for their children. 
3. Beginning at the turn of the century there was a large influx of women 
into professional occupations. This reinforced the decline in natural reproduction 
among professionals. Intellectuals, being well educated and independent, had a 
below average incidence of marriage. In 1910, for example, two-thirds of woman 
secondary school teachers in Hungary were single. 
Because of the rapid growth in the demand for educated people, falling 
incomes for them, and their decreasing natural reproduction, the Hungarian 
intelligentsia was non-discriminating with regards to its recruitment. This 
contrasts, as we saw, with its exclusive status and mentality.22 
Now let us look at our second question: what was the distribution of educational 
opportunities among social classes and strata? 
This problem is important because the social and historical justice of 
educational inequality was debated in the political and journalistic arena without 
an accurate knowledge of the actual circumstances and processes. 
Statistical data confirm that by the beginning of the century there were 
large gaps between traditional village society and the urban classes, and between 
the upper classes (intelligentsia, large landowners, urban bourgeoisie) and the 
lower classes (peasantry, agricultural and industrial workers). The group of 
doormen and office messengers, located at the lowest level of the urban petty 
bourgeoisie, had a much better chance of providing their children with a profes-
sional education than did the landowning peasantry. 
The ethnic aspect of intellectual recruitment also becomes strikingly 
evident from the available statistical data (see table 5 on the following page). 
The representation of Hungarians in the ranks of the intelligentsia constantly 
increased during the dualist period, and in 1908 it was one-and-a-half times 
greater than the proportion of Hungarians in all of the population. But if we 
consider not only the declared nationality but also the spoken language of 
students, it appears that nearly half of all students were born to and grew up in 
families belonging to Hungary's national minorities. Most of these students, 
however, were on their way to being culturally and linguistically assimilated, i.e. 
Magyarized. 
Table 5. The ethnic makeup of the student population of secondary schools in 
Hungary (expressed in percentages). 
Nationality 1870-71 1880-81 1890-91 1898-99 1908-09 1914-15 
Hungarian 73.56 70.75 72.38 75.55 79.92 83.93 
German 12.35 15.30 14.72 12.70 8.83 6.75 
Rumanian 7.73 6.39 6.42 5.67 6.24 5.37 
Slovak 4.13 4.76 3.77 3.27 2.56 1.85 
Serbo-Croat 1.74 2.20 1.89 1.96 1.87 1.45 
Ruthenian 0.86 0.60 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.05 
Other 
- - - -
0.61 0.66 0.45 0.59 
Total num-
bers 36,464 38,567 42,116 54,676 67,699 76,856 
With respect to religion, the composition of the student body indicates 
that Jews, Lutherans (chiefly Germans), and Transylvania's Unitarians were over-
represented in the recruitment into the intelligentsia (see tabic 6). 
Table 6. The religious makeup of the student population of secondary schools 
in Hungary (expressed in percentages). 
Religion 1870-71 1880-81 1890-91 1898-99 1908-09 1914-15 
Roman 
Catholic 45.99 44.08 44.50 43.43 43,46 45.39 
Uniate 5.30 4.44 4.51 4.34 4.55 4.23 
Greek 
Orthodox 5.74 5.00 5.34 5.06 5.48 4.62 
Calvinist 12.37 10.81 10.76 10.05 9.20 8.85 
Lutheran 18.36 14.15 14.02 14.30 14.29 13.99 
Unitarian 0.97 0.85 0.71 0.71 0.79 0.73 
Jewish i 1.26 20.26 20.16 22.13 22.23 22.16 
Total num-
bers 36,464 38,567 42,116 54,676 67,699 76,856 
A comparative examination indicates that the over- and under-representa-
tion of ethnic and religious groups of Hungary's intelligentsia was closely 
correlated to its members' social status and, to a lesser extent, to the degree of 
their assimilation within Hungarian society. 
In conclusion it might be stated that the lopsided modernization in 
Hungary during the period of dualism (1867-1914) led to the birth of a neo-
corporatist society in which the lack of social self-government was to some 
extent counterbalanced or compensated for by the cultural and administrative 
competence of the intelligentsia. This social stratum of dualist Hungary was 
characterized by a largely self-imposed segregation from other elements of 
society, a distinct mentality, a unique attitude to politics, a marked preference for 
urban living, and high expectations concerning the children in regards to educa-
tion as well as economic and cultural achievements. The Hungarian intelligen-
tsia of the time constituted an exclusive class of educated gentlemen or gentle-
women which — contrary to what might be expected at first glance — was non-
discriminating in the processes of its recruitment. 
Interestingly enough, many of the characteristics of this late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century intelligentsia have survived the passage of time, and 
some of them persist even today especially in families with gentry backgrounds. 
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A Guide to the Holdings of the 
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Eliza Gardiner, comp. 
with an introduction by George Bisztray 
Hungarians often bemoan the fact that the world does not know them, or 
misunderstands them. One may argue that "the world" does not notice many 
other countries either. Or, one may turn the table and remind the Hungarians that 
they should have done more to propagate their cultural heritage. The fact that no 
representative text of any length is available in English translation by Miklos 
Zrfnyi and Ferenc Kolcsy or, by Lorand Eotvos and the great feminist Mrs. Pal 
Veres, speaks for itself. 
Hungarian drama is a case in point. After the 1950s it has become widely 
known among Western intellectuals that countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia 
have an especially cxciting theatre life and a number of first-rate, world-class 
playwrights, such as Mrozck and Rozewicz, Havel, Klfma, and Kohout. In 
comparison, Hungary has been doing much poorer. The relative success of the 
cinema and a great volume of haphazard, mostly inadequate literary translations 
into English by no means make up for the fact that many facets of the Hungarian 
creative spirit were never made available to readers of other languages. Having 
taught Hungarian drama for more than a decade, my conviction is that the best 
plays of Csurka, Hubay, Siito, or Szakonyi do have their place side by side the 
modern masters of Centra! European playwriting. And, then, we have not yet 
rendered justice to such classics as Jozsef Katona, Ede Szigligeti, or Gergely 
Csfky, who also belong among the world's best. 
The bibliography published below is a more than sufficient proof of how 
little the Anglo-American reader can learn about Hungarian drama. It includes 
virtually all primary and secondary works available in the collections of the 
Robarts Research Library of the University of Toronto, which has the largest 
Hungarian collection in Canada. A comparison with the National Union Cata-
logue that lists titles in the libraries of the United States, would almost certainly 
not bring any true surprises. 
Among the primary sources we find five translations of Imre Madach's 
The Tragedy of Man — none really successful. Furthermore, we also find many 
plays by Ferenc Molnar, and three eclectic anthologies of some more recent 
dramas. In the past, the New Hungarian Quarterly printed several plays, though 
some of them were excerpted. While there are a few in-depth monographs 
among the secondary sources, there is also a conspicuous absence of book-size 
surveys of the Hungarian drama, or, monographs other than the ones on Madach 
and Molnar. 
While my colleagues in the University of Toronto's Department of Slavic 
Studies are able to teach Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian drama in English transla-
tion, it is clear that, because of the paucity of translations, the teaching of 
Hungarian drama in English has to be reduced to rudimentary basics, or, in the 
case of graduate students, it must be confined to special topics such as assessing 
the quality of the English translations of The Tragedy of Man. Our disturbing 
conclusion has to be that, by not making concerted, energctic efforts to propagate 
Hungarian drama through representative translations, Hungary missed yet another 
opportunity to make her rich culture better known in the English-speaking world. 
As a first step in remedying this situation, I am preparing a selection of post-
1945 Hungarian drama in English translation in order to open up this little-
known cultural asset of Hungary to the wider reading public of the world. 
G.B. 
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Stephen Bela Vardy 
Tibor Giant. A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai, 1945-1978 [The 
American Adventures of the Holy Crown, 1945-1978]. Debrecen: 
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiado, 1997. 181 pages. 
The Holy Crown of Hungary — also known as Saint Stephen's Crown — has 
been in the centre of political controversy for several decades. This was espe-
cially true in the late 1970s, when President Carter's decision to return the 
Crown to its homeland — after three decades in American "protection" or 
"captivity" — precipitated a veritable storm of protest by a significant segment 
of the Hungarian political emigration in the Western World. 
This held particularly true for the Hungarian political emigration in the 
United States, whose members were most immediately affected by the Crown's 
repatriation. Their protracted and often desperate protest activities are chronicled 
at length in the documentary collection compiled by Attila L. Simontsits in his 
The Last Battle for Saint Stephen's Crown (1983).1 
Ever since the Holy Crown's return to Hungary, scholars have been chur-
ning out articles and books about its origins and its artistic composition. They 
have also reassessed its role in Hungarian history, particularly in light of the 
"Doctrine of the Holy Crown," which had assigned to the Holy Crown an 
unusual role in the constitutional development of Hungary. In point of fact, ever 
since the fourteenth century — according to some, ever since St. Stephen's reign 
in the early eleventh century — the Holy Crown had been made into the symbol 
and representative of royal power, and even of Hungarian statehood itself. In line 
with this doctrine, laws were passed and judicial decisions were made not in the 
name of the king, but rather in the name of the Holy Crown. Moreover, no king 
was viewed as the legitimate ruler of Hungary unless and until crowned by the 
Holy Crown that generally came to be referred to as "St. Stephen's Crown."2 
While many of the books published during the last two decades since the 
Crown's repatriation are useful,3 most of them are too specialized for the average 
reader. Moreover, with the exception of Sandor Hahn's A Szent Korona utja es 
sorsa [The Path and Fate of the Holy CrownJ, most of them also devote rela-
tively little attention to the Crown's sojourn in America, which was only one of 
the Crowns several similar tribulations during the past one thousand years. 
The situation is very different with the volume under review. Tibor 
Giant's A Szent Korona amerikai kakandjai [The American Adventures of the 
Holy CrownJ is a delightful book devoted specifically to the latter topic. The 
author is a learned scholar, who has approached his topic in the spirit of de-
tached objectivity. His book, therefore, is a scholarly work, which at the same 
time is oriented not only to the specialist, but also to the general reader. It is 
based partially upon archival sources, partially upon published primary and 
secondary sources, and partially upon personal interviews with individuals who 
have been involved in the Holy Crown's arrival to the United States and its 
return to Hungary. 
Giant's A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai is divided into eight chapters, 
which covcr the Crown's tempestuous sojourn from Budapest to Fort Knox and 
back in the period between 1944 and 1978. The first chapter discusses the 
Crown's stormy departure from Hungary and how it got into American hands in 
the months following the World War II (pp. 19-33). The next three chapters 
narrate and analyze the changing relationship between Hungary and the United 
States during the three postwar decades, right up to President Jimmy Carter's 
decision to return the Crown to the country which in those days was generally 
viewed as the land of "goulash communism" (pp. 35-85). Chapter five is devoted 
to the somewhat quixotic efforts of the Hungarian political immigrants and their 
American allies to prevent the Crown's repatriation (pp. 87-102), while chapters 
six and seven treat the events surrounding the actual repatriation process itself, 
both in the United States and in Hungary (pp. 103-131). The final chapter 
describes the Crown's reception by the Hungarian public, the views and the fate 
of the main players in this repatriation process, and further developments in 
Hungarian-American relations in light of the Holy Crown's return to Hungary 
(pp. 133-141). Tibor Giant's book is supplemented by a series of relevant and 
useful photographs (pp. 145-167), endnotes (pp. 169-173), sources and bibliogra-
phy (pp. 175-178), as well as an essay in which the author expresses his grati-
tude to those who have helped him in the realization of this undertaking (pp. 
179-181). The main text is preceded by a Preface from the pen of Ferenc 
Esztergalyos (b. 1927), the former Hungarian ambassador to the United States, 
who himself had played a considerable role in the Crown's repatriation (pp. 
9-11); and also by the author's own Foreword, which itself is in the nature of a 
short historical essay (pp. 13-17). 
All in all Tibor Giant's A Szent Korona amerikai kalandjai is a marvel-
lous little volume, which is well-researched, displays the objectivity of a learned 
scholar, and is written in a style that makes it read almost like a novel. As is 
always true with scholarly books, however, there are a few questionable points in 
this volume as well, but they detract very little f rom the essential high quality of 
this work. 
One of these questions has to do with author's interpretation of the 
Doctrine of the Holy Crown, which, according to him, developed in the above-
described form only during the interwar years (pp. 13-14). This view does have 
some validity, for the Horthy Regime did in fact expand and amplify this 
doctrine so as to place it in the service of its revisionist goals — a phenomenon 
which I have also noted some two decades ago in my Modern Hungarian 
Historiography.5 Yet, one should not forget that this doctrine had evolved 
already in the fourteenth century under the Anjou dynasty, and that it had been 
codified essentially in identical form by Palatine Istvan Werboczi in his Tri-
partitum in 1514. 
One may also question Tibor Giant's assertion to the effect that only 
American archivists call Hungary's Holy Crown the "Crown of St. Stephen" (p. 
14). It is undoubtedly true that American scholars and publicists generally refer 
to Hungary's sacred relic by those terms, but they do so only because they have 
borrowed this expression from established Hungarian practice. Hungary's Holy 
Crown had been known as St. Stephen's Crown at least f rom the thirteenth 
century onward, and only in the late nineteenth century did scholars begin to 
question its direct link to the country's first Christian king. But even most of 
them believed that the upper half did reach back to King St. Stephen, and only 
the lower half was a later addition — a view that this still held today by a 
number of scholars.6 Therefore, calling the Holy Crown of Hungary "St. 
Stephen's Crown" is not necessarily wrong, and it certainly is not the invention 
of American archivists. This appellation is based on long-standing Hungarian 
traditions that reach back almost to the very beginnings of written historical 
sources in Hungary. As such, its use would still be justifiable even if art 
historians were to prove conclusively that the Holy Crown is a later creation and 
therefore not identical with the crown that King Stephen had received from Pope 
Sylvester 11 in the year 1000 A.D. 
Although understandable, asking ambassador Ferenc Esztergalyos to write 
the preface to this volume may not have been the wisest decision on the part of 
the author. This is so primarily because the former ambassador's involvement in 
the Crown's repatriation placed him into the first rank of the adversaries of those 
who opposed its return to communist Hungary. Thus, by giving Esztergalyos 
such a prominent place in his book — despite the ambassador's positive role in 
the affair and the respect that he had shown toward this holy relic — Giant may 
well be accused by the representatives of the Hungarian political emigration of 
being less than objective in his treatment of the events surrounding this repatria-
tion. Signs of this disapproval have already surfaced, and they will undoubtedly 
increase in the future, even though the book itself is a model of historical 
objectivity.' 
* * * 
All in all, Tibor Giant has written a worthy volume that deserves our praise and 
our appreciation. It reflects pedantic research, meticulous scholarship, and a 
captivating style that makes it difficult to put it down. It has much to offer even 
to the specialists, and as such it deserves the recognition and support of the 
Hungarian scholarly world, as well as of the Hungarian reading public. I recom-
mend it very highly to everyone who is interested in modern Hungarian, Central 
European, and even American diplomatic history. I also hope that the book will 
soon appear in a slightly revised English language edition, so as to make it 
available at American and other English-language universities. 
NOTES 
1. The l-ast Battle for Saint Stephen's Crown. A Chronological Documentation, 
compiled by Attila L. Simonisits (Toronto: Weilcr Publishing Co., 1983). 
2. Concerning the development of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, see the 
following writings: Erno Nagy, "Korona" [Crown] in Magyar Jogi Lexikon, ed. Dezso 
Markus, 6 vols. (Budapest: Pallas Irodalmi es Nyomdai Reszvenylarsasag, 1898-1907), 
vol. 5, pp. 35-38; Ferenc Eckhart, A szent korona eszme [The Doctrine of the Holy 
Crown] (Budapest, 1941); Marton Sarlos, "A 'szentkorona tan' kialakulasahoz" [Concern-
ing the Development of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown], in Jogtudomdnyi Kozlony, vol. 
15 (1960), pp. 557-600; lozsef Kardos, "Az Eckhart-vita es a szentkorona tan" [The 
Eckhart controversy and the Doctrine of the Holy Crown], in Szdz.adok, vol. 103 (1969), 
pp. 1104-1117; and Istvdin Kocsis, A Szent Korona tana. Multja, jelene, jovdje [The 
Doctrine of the Holy Crown. Its Past, its Present, its Future] (Budapest, 1995). 
3. The best of these books include the following: Bertenyi Ivan, A magyar 
korona tortenete [History of the Hungarian Crown] (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 
1978), 4th enlarged edition, 1996; A korona kilenc evszazada. Tortenelmi forrdsok a 
magyar korondrol [The Crown's Nine Centuries, Historical Sources about the Hungarian 
Crownl, ed. Tamas Katona (Budapest: Magyar Helikon, 1979); Kalman Benda and Erik 
Fugedi, A magyar korona regenye [The Story of the Hungarian Crown] (Budapest: 
Magveto Kiado, 1979); Eva Kovacs and Zsuzsa Lovag, A magyar korondzasi jelvenyek 
[Hungarian Royal Insignia] (Budapest: Corvina Kiado, 1980); Zsuzsa Lovag, "A 
korona-kutatas vadhajtasai" [The Wildings of Crown Research], in Muveszettorteneti 
Ertesito (1986) nos. 1-2, pp. 35-48; Lajos Csomor, Magyarorszdg Szent Koronaja 
[Hungary's Holy Crown] (Vaja: Vay Ad5m Muzeum Bar&ti Kore, 1988); and Istvan 
Kocsis, A Szent Korona tana, cit. (see note 2). 
4. Sandor Hahn, A Szent Korona utja es sorsa a Kiralyi Vartol Fort Knoxig, 
1945-1978 [The Path and Fate of the Holy Crown from the Royal Castle to Fort Knox, 
1945-1978] (New York: A szerzo kiadasa, 1984). 
5. Steven Bcla Vardy, Modern Hungarian Historiography (New York: East 
European Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 179-183. 
6. Among the first scholars to question the Crown's connection to King St. 
Stephen was the noted positivist historian Gyula Pauler (1841-1903) in his A magyar 
nemzet tortenete az Arpadhazi kiralyok alatt [History of the Hungarian Nation under the 
Arpadian Kings] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1899). His views, however, were immediately 
attacked by the equally influential Janos Karacsonyi (1858-1929) in his Hogyan lett 
Szent Istvan Korondja a magyar szent korona felsld reszeve [How did St. Stephen's 
Crown Become the Upper Part of the Hungarian Holy Crown?] (Budapest: Magyar 
Tudomanyos Akad£mia, 1907). For the various modern views see Korai Magyar 
Torteneti Lexikon, editor-in-chief Gyula Kristo (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1994), p. 
634; and Steven Bela Vardy, Historical Dictionary of Hungary (Lanham & London: The 
Scarecrow Press, 1997), pp. 338-339. 
7. Tibor Giant has already been accused of political bias and a lack of objectiv-
ity in a personal letter written by the Hungarian-American political activist, Istvan 
Gerebcn of Washington, D.C., who denounced the author for pursuing a path that 
reminded him "of the tone, ideological orientation, and... exploitive manipulations of the 
Leninist Seminars" he had experienced during his student days at a university in 
Hungary. Cf. Istvan Gereben's letter to Tibor Giant, March 21, 1998, which was 
e-mailcd to me by Giant on March 24, 1998. 
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Richard Teleky, Hungarian Rhapsodies (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, and Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1997), xv + 217 pages. 
This is a subjective review of a book whose author characterizes it as "a combi-
nation of essay, lament, celebration, and scholarship" (p. xiii). The unusual 
character of the volume justifies the unusual review, especially since it is 
documented with twelve pages of notes and fifteen pages of bibliography, which 
validate the exposed facts of mind and soul. 
There will be several critical observations in my review. Before anyone 
misunderstands this fact, let me express my admiration for Teleky's book. With 
regard to Hungarian culture, it may be unique in its genre, and it is definitely an 
eye-opener for those among us for whom the richncss of Hungarian culture is 
easily accessible because of our proficiency in the language. In this book a 
sensitive and highly educated mind is expressing a moving yearning to belong to 
a culture, to be accepted by his heritage which himself has already accepted. 
The author was born and raised in Cleveland by Hungarian parents who 
gave him insight into the psyche of their ancestral culture, but did not teach him 
the language. The little information he got as a child about Hungary, mostly 
about the countryside, came from his grandparents. He did not visit Hungary 
until the age of forty-seven. He is one of those hundreds of thousands of North 
Americans whose family must have been regarded as "good immigrants" by the 
receiving country: hard-working and eager to assimilate. In the meantime, they 
became lost for Hungary, perhaps also for themselves. In seemingly unrelated 
essays Teleky traces his long way back to his roots, and to the understanding of 
what he calls "Hungarianness." This was a conscious search, chosen and under-
taken by an adult. In the meantime, the author became editor-in-chief of the 
Canadian branch of Oxford University Press, then retired from publishing and 
now teaches at York University in Toronto. 
Of the twelve essays, seven are reprinted from earlier publications in 
various North American journals, and a further three were also published 
previously in a shorter version. It is a rare luxury for North American authors to 
have their dispersed essays published also in collective volumes, but the reader 
should welcome the opportunity to receive them in such convenient form. The 
arrangement of the papers does not appear to follow any logic but, the title of 
the volume being what it is, let's call the sequence rhapsodic. At least the 
reviewer can also take some liberties with logic. 
Teleky's understanding of Hungarianness is limited, which he knows. 
Judging from his confessions, he has been studying the language diligently for 
some years but is not yet entirely at home in it. Most of his information is based 
on English sources. Why? Because "Hungarian is a notoriously difficult lan-
guage" (p. 118). While countering stereotypes about Hungarians (oncc with 
critical intellect, another time with good-natured irony, depending on the stereo-
type), Teleky too perpetuates this die-hard one about the language which many 
Hungarians also proudly profess as proof of their being different. It is hoped that 
whoever finds Hungarian "notoriously difficult" has already tried learning Polish 
or Greek or Hindi, relatives of English, not to mention Japanese which, like 
Hungarian, is no Indo-European language. Only after such comparative venture 
would this sweeping generalization be valid. (Which is not to say that Hungarian 
is an easy language. Only that there are no objective criteria of which languages 
arc "difficult" and which ones "easy." Dezso Kosztolanyi knew this, as one can 
read in his polcmic "open letter" to the French linguist Antoinc Meillet, written 
about seventy years ago.) 
It irks Telcky, as a man of letters, to witness the undcr-represcntation of 
Hungarian literature in English translation, and the segregation of North Ameri-
can Hungarian literature from mainstream Canadian or American fiction. Can 
we blame only the North American cultural mentality, however? The reading list 
Teleky compiled for his course on Central European literature at York University 
is reproduced in full, and the Hungarian titles show how little representative the 
available volumes are. The uncoordinated, haphazard way of singling out 
Hungarian works for translation also amazed me many times. With all that pride 
taken in national literature, it was, alas, never a successful vehicle to promote 
Hungary. 
Hungarian political and cultural propaganda was never coordinated and, 
as one may fear, never will be. Our terra incognita is an ideal breeding ground 
for stereotypes, something that the book discusscs as one of its central themes. 
Stereotypes in society, literature, and the cinema: we have to be grateful that not 
all of them are negative ones, although most of them are. Those who have read 
Teleky's report on Margaret Atwood's story "Wilderness Tips," with its gro-
tesquely repulsive Hungarian-Canadian protagonist, will have a lasting opinion 
about this celebrated author's ethical standards (pp. 58-60). As we know, 
success does not come from, or create, an honest personality. A whole critical 
essay (one of my favourites) discusses the outrageously insincere and slanderous 
movie, "The Music Box" (1989). Joe Eszterhas, the scriptwriter, may have 
attained a dubious fame with his contribution to such cinema "classics" as 
"Flashdance" and "Basic Instinct," yet his defamatory handling of anybody and 
anything Hungarian in "The Music Box" deserves Teleky's well-applied term, 
"ethnic self-hate" (64-65).' Also, as Teleky points out, insincerity produces bad 
art. Which is, of course, pretty obvious if one considers the overall output of 
Hollywood. 
Is this just another example of Hungarian paranoia that we don't cease to 
imagine ourselves as whipping boys? Teleky knows that, in spite of the attention 
and improved image that Hungary has received recently, nasty old stereotypes 
live on to serve fiendish new purposes. As he writes about Atwood's character: 
"Atwood is too clever a writer to make 'George' a black Jamaican, a Soviet Jew, 
or a Vietnamese businessman. He is Hungarian because Hungarianness provides 
a safe target" (p. 60). We all knew the above, yet we dared to bring it up only 
in low-voiced private conversations lest we be regarded once again as racists and 
anti-Semites, which arc two frequent epithets used for us "Eastern Europeans." 
Teleky's courage was overdue, yet the more praiseworthy. 
Indignation over Hungarian-bashing alternates with good-natured humour, 
which is another means to defeat ignorance. In the chapter "A Short Dictionary 
of Hungarian Stereotypes" he discusses such examples as the "Hungarian lover," 
"Csardas" [sic], "Goulash," "Gypsy music," "Paprika," even the fashionable 
turn-of-century American painter Virginia O'Keeffe whose maternal grandfather, 
as we learn, was a Hungarian count and Kossuth's aide-de-camp in the 1848-49 
Hungarian war of liberation. (Strangely, history books never mention this Count 
Totto, and the reader wonders why.) The two recipes that Teleky reprints here: 
that of the goulash and the chicken paprikas [sic], are authentic and dclicious. 
Perhaps the most penetrating observations that the author makes are the 
most subjective ones: reflections on immigration and cthnicity. Childhood 
memories of Cleveland's St. Elizabeth church lead him to examine the role of 
religion in preserving ethnic coherence and heritage language. Upon revisiting 
the church as an adult, he is interested not only in the stained-glass windows, 
objects of his childhood fascination, but also in the archives, pondering all the 
while what will happen to this spiritual centre now that its "vital neighborhood 
link" has been cut,2 (At another place he expresses similar, justified concern 
about the erosion of Hungarian Studies at North American universities.)3 The 
fascinating juxtapositions of adolescent dreams and adult realities also appear in 
the description of image building. "Just as fairy tales have forests and castles, 
[Hungary has been] part of my imagination." (p. 172). With a slight twist, after 
his first visit to the ancestral land, he says: "my associations with the country are 
no longer from other people's lives — my family's, or favorite writers'. I have 
people to correspond with and to see again." (p. 164). This concrcteness of the 
"ethnic experience" is impossible in the new world exclusively — something that 
Canadian ethnic studies are still reluctant to accept. 
Continuing the observations on immigrant mentality, the author points out 
that assimilation was never completely possible for the immigrants: between the 
world wars "deeper loyalties, fears, and anxieties kept the Hungarians keenly 
interested in the affairs of their homeland." (p. 40). Only when the passing time 
slowly ended community life and newer immigrants did not find structures to 
accommodate them did "the melting pot [become! a reality more by erosion than 
by choice." (p. 41). Xenophobia (illustrated by several instances f rom the film 
"The Music Box" [p. 71]), the "badge of foreignness" that Teleky confesses to 
have often felt (if not for other reasons, then for the frequent misspellings of his 
family name [p. 170]), and an "American distance from ethnicity" (p. 175) are 
some of the formidable obstacles facing immigrants in their uphill struggle for 
acceptance. As for today's Canada, according to Teleky, it "officially advances 
an idea of multiculturalism, but always in relation to a dominant culture that 
knows its identity as truly Canadian." (p. 175). The author does not seem to be 
happy about the term "ethnic" (p. 171) and states, perhaps unkindly but justly, 
that currently "'multiculturalism' tends to refer to non-European ethnicities," for 
which reason "it seems unlikely that Hungarian American subjects will come to 
the fore or be fashionable." (p. 62). A timely cold shower to cool down never-
subsiding Hungarian illusions. 
I found only three minor factual errors in the book — let mc mention just 
one here. Teleky writes that Hungary was occupied "by Germans for only a few 
years during the Second World War." (p. 153). Actually, Hungary was under 
German occupation only for a little over a year — and the eastern parts of the 
country for less than half that time. The author and I live in the same city but 
we have never met — should I have the pleasure to do so in the future, I'll point 
out to him the two other errors. I will also have questions for him: for instance, 
how could he so astonishingly misread a simple statement in my book on 
Hungarian-Canadian literature (p. 56). Or, whether he really tried to take an 
elementary Hungarian language course at the University of Toronto, about which 
he sweepingly writes: "Each time I've registered in [such] a course, with the 
assurance that it would be introductory, I was soon lost in a room of young 
people who already had more than a rudimentary knowledge of the language" (p. 
5). I wonder where this personal experience comes from, if it is indeed a 
personal one. 
Considering the fact that Teleky's information about Hungary is almost 
exclusively based on English language materials, he is eminently knowledgeable 
about many things. As a matter of fact, his zeal for information carries him away 
into directions where the goal is not worth the effort. He writes reproachfully 
about the University of Toronto's library in which he could not find any book by 
Arpad Goncz when the latter became president of the republic (pp. 101-102). 
The reason is, as Hungarians discreetly know, that Goncz was an undistinguished 
writer. He had published three volumes before stepping into office. Now that he 
has gained notoriety, however, even the University of Toronto's library has 
several of his volumes. 
The long bibliography looks impressive. Still, one wonders why Hannah 
Arendt's correspondence with Karl Jaspers, or Aronowitz's The Politics of 
Identity (among others) are such essential sources of information when basic 
works like Francis Wagner's Hungarian Contributions to World Civilization 
(1978), Zoltan Bodolai's The Timeless Nation (1978), or Stephen Sisa's The Spirit 
of Hungary (1983) are missing. Having arrived at the end of the volume, having 
sifted through the bibliography titles, having ascertained that the author missed a 
few useful works and had to rely on many peripheral ones, one ponders: is this 
all that we can offer to third generation North American Hungarians in their own 
language, which is, almost invariably, English? 
Alas, we have to conclude that it is. And, even offering books may not be 
enough. Besides reading such books as Teleky's, third generation North Ameri-
can Hungarians need perseverance, intellect, and discrimination to sort and 
organize the facts to re-connect with their ancestral Hungarian culture. Very few 
young people of Hungarian extraction have Teleky's bitter and heroic determina-
tion to sacrifice decades of their life to redeem the omissions that had been made 
by their family, the Hungarian North American community, and their ancestral 
nation. This book is a warning to all of us. 
The other day my son-in-law asked me to give him a book about Hun-
garians. He is a very typical mainstream American without any Hungarian 
ancestry. A short and uncomplicated survey of Hungary: history, people, geo-
graphical areas, customs, and the arts — was his desire; and... T had nothing to 
offer him. 
NOTES 
1. In "Hollywood, Ethnicity and Joe Eszterhas," pp. 63-73. 
2. "The Archives of St.Elizabeth of Hungary," pp. 32-43. 
3. Cf. p. xiii. 
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Gyula Kristo. Hungarian History in the Ninth Century. Szeged: 
Szegedi Kozepkorasz Muhely, 1996. 231 pages. 
The book under review by one of Hungary's most noted medievalists is a 
history of the Magyar tribal federation in the ninth century, a period which 
ended with the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin (Historic Hungary). 
The manuscript was originally prepared for publication in the United States, but 
"for reasons other than professional" it never appeared in print until it was 
published in Hungary some five years later. The decision not to publish it in the 
United Slates is really unfortunate, because Professor Kristo's synthesis is a most 
worthy volume. It should be readily available in the English speaking world, and 
certainly more so than it is possible through the efforts of a small regional 
Hungarian publisher. 
The book covers the century before the Arpadian Conquest of Hungary in 
fifteen chapters, whose topics stretch from the first appearance of the Hungarians 
in written sources to the above-mentioned conquest of the Carpathian Basin at 
the turn of the ninth to the tenth century. The chapters in between these two 
extremes treat such diverse topics as the ethnogenesis of the Hungarian people, 
the locations of the earlier Hungarian homelands, the relationship of the Hungari-
ans to various Turkic peoples who have influenced the evolution of their lan-
guage and culture, the origin and meaning of the various national names of the 
Magyars, their alleged relationship to the Huns of Attila's fame, their temporary 
homelands while on their way to the Carpathian Basin, the main historical 
sources of their nation building at the time of the Conquest, the role of Prince 
Levedi in this process of nation building, the nature and meaning of their heroic 
legends and archeological remains, their position and role within the Khazar 
Empire, their relationship to the Kangars and the Kabars, the role of Prince 
Almos and his sacred kingship just before the Conquest, and finally the general 
condition of the Hungarian tribal federation at the time of the conquest of future 
Historic Hungary. 
These chapters are complemented by two historical maps, a list of the 
most important primary sources, as well as by a detailed index of geographical 
terms, ethnic designations, personal names, and the names of the authors of the 
main primary and secondary sources. 
The book is an unusually well thought-out and well documented scholarly 
work that treats most of the questions, problems and debatable issues concerning 
the history of the early Magyars. At the same time, however, it is not an easy 
reading. The data contained in the individual chapters is so detailed and massive 
that unless one is already versed in the history of ninth-century Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is easy to get lost amidst the details. In consequence of this, 
Kristo's book is probably more useful to the historian than to the general reader. 
Even so, it is a book that should be available in all of the major academic and 
public libraries of North America, for it is the product of the scholarly effort of 
one of the most significant Hungarian medievalists in the twentieth-century 
Hungary. It would be a great service to the profession if an American publisher 
would find (his book worthy of translation, publication and mass distribution in 
the English speaking world. 
Steven Bela Vardy 
Duquesne University 
Janos Makkay. A magyarsag keltezese [The Dating of Hungarians]. 
Szolnok: Damjanich Janos Muzeum, 1994. 2nd, revised and enlarged 
edition. 231 pages. 
This book 's title could be translated into English more freely as "the chronology 
of Hungarian origins." In it, Makkay, an eminent archeologist, discusses Gyula 
Laszlo's hypothesis of the "double conquest" of the Carpathian Basin by the 
Hungarians, a theory which postulates that the ancestors of the Magyars ap-
peared in the Middle Danube basin for the first time not in 896 — as it is 
traditionally held — but ccnturies earlier. 
Makkay observes that the current received version of the Hungarians' 
origins maintains that between the 4th and 9th centuries a.d. the Bulgaro-Turkic 
(or Onogur) ruling class of the ancient Hungarian nomadic tribes began a process 
of acculturation to the masses of Finno-Ugric-speaking subjects they ruled. This 
supposedly happened on the southern Russian steppes. Through this process the 
Hungarian language is supposed to have been enriched by about 300 Bulgaro-
Turkic (or early Chuvash) loan-words, most of them relating to animal hus-
bandry. In 894 a.d., threatened by other invading Turkish peoples, the Magyars 
fled to the West and, under the leadership of Arpad, in 895-896 settled in the 
Carpathian Basin. Arpad and the other tribal chiefs of the Hungarians had Turkic 
names and contemporary Byzantine sources refer to them as Turkoi or Turks. 
This tends to confirm the theory that the rulers of the Magyars were of Turkic 
origin. The Turkish language, however, rapidly disappeared, either at the time of 
the "conquest" or very soon after it. In the onomastics of the Arpad dynasty, 
Prince Vajk (after 1001 known as King Stephen and, later, as King St. Stephen) 
and, as T suppose, his son Imre (the later St. Imre or St. Emeric), and his nephew 
Vazul (as well as his son Levcntc), were the last Magyar leaders to receive 
Turkic names, which suggests an earlier acculturation by this ruling class, for in 
cases of language shift the change in namegiving usually follows the disappear-
ance of the language by one or two generations. 
Against this widely accepted view, Gyula Laszlo had advanced a radically 
different theory. In studies which appeared in 1944 and thereafter, Laszlo 
argued that the peoples who spoke proto- or old-Magyar dialects might have 
moved into the Carpathian Basin well before 895-6, possibly as subjugated tribes 
of the Huns (4-5th century a.d.), or of the early Avars (6th century), or as allies 
of the Middle or Late Avars (or Onogurs), around 670-680. In effect, Laszlo 
claims that various groups of Magyar-speaking peoples were present in the 
Carpathian Basin well before the 896 conqucst, and the Bulgaro-Turkic loan-
words entered the Hungarian language here, and not during the Hungarians' 
sojourn through the southern Russian stcpplands. Makkay argues that, if indeed 
Laszlo's theory is valid, the middle Iranian (Alan) loan words in Hungarian came 
not from the Ossetians of the north Caucasian region, but were borrowed from 
the Sarmatian peoples living in the Carpathian Basin from Roman times through 
the Hun and Avar eras. According to Makkay, the same is true of the numerous 
Slavic loan-words in Magyar: these entered the Magyar language not after the 
Hungarian conquest, i.e. in the 10th and 11th centuries, but at an earlier date 
from the South-Slav peoples who also lived together with the Hungarians in the 
Middle Danube basin under Avar rule. In this connection Makkay points out 
that, notwithstanding the fact that after Hungary's conversion to Christianity it 
received its priests from Germany and Italy, the Hungarian religious terminology 
is not of German or Italian origin, but Slavonic, which suggests that a certain 
degree linguistic-religious acculturation among Hungarians had started to take 
place before 896, in the Carpathian Basin. 
Arguing along these lines, Makkay postulates that, with the collapse of 
the Avar Empire in the early part of the 9th century, the Avar ruling class 
disappeared from the Carpathian Basin but the subject Hungarian population 
remained there. This speculation gives rise to the theory that in 895 Arpad 
entered this land not with a large Hungarian population in tow, but with a much 
smaller military force of Turkic-speaking warriors (with whom there probably 
were some Hungarian-speaking auxiliaries). This conquering force subdued the 
Magyars who were living in the Carpathian Basin apparently without any 
military or political organization, and Arpad and his successors established a 
viable, strong state, in which the Magyars initially constituted the humbler strata 
of society. Supporting this theory is the fact that in many 11th century docu-
ments the peasants mentioned have names of Finno-Ugric origin, while among 
the leaders the ratio of Turkic names is high. Makkay even speculates on the 
proportion of the Hungarian population that lived in the Carpathian Basin before 
the conquest and suggest that this was probably four or five times greater than 
the size of Arpad's conquering host. This pre-896 population of Hungarians in 
the Middle Danube region amounted to about half-a-million, according to 
Makkay, and included the ancestors of the Szekelys of Transylvania whose 
alleged Turkic origin Makkay rejects.1 
Laszlo's original impetus for postulating the theory of the pre-896 
settlement of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin had been a sudden change 
(around 680 a.d.) that archeologist observed to have taken place in Avar metal 
ornamentation, when the so-called griffin and tendril motives appeared. The fact 
that after 896 the local population is known to have continued to use the same 
cemeteries that the people of the late-Avar period used, only strengthened 
Laszlo's conviction. In reinforcing Laszlo's theory, Makkay adduces indirect 
arguments from the fields and disciplines of toponymy, etymology, paleogeog-
raphy, etc. He argues, inter alia, that the runic script (rovasirds) of the Szekelys 
originated before 896, in the Carpathian Basin. 
All-in-all, Makkay's book is the most comprehensive study of the theory 
of the "double conquest." A detailed summary in English (pp. 199-228) allows 
the non-Hungarian reader to get acquainted with this interesting historiographical 
controversy. Notwithstanding the publication of Makkay's work, most Hungarian 
historians will probably continue to doubt the validity of Gyula Laszlo's hypothe-
sis. 
Jozsef Vekerdi 
Budapest 
1. Regarding the origins of the settlement of Transylvania, a question of 
intense and bitter controversy between Hungarian and Rumanian historians, 
Makkay refers to the brilliant study of Laszlo Rasonyi who, following the 
remarkable hint of Dezso Pais, demonstrated that the mysterious Blacus people 
whom the Arpadian conquerors encountered in 9th century Transylvania were 
not Wallachians, as the Romanian theory of "daco-Roman continuity" claims, but 
a Turkic people, the Bulaqs. Thus it is quite reasonable that their leader had a 
Turkic (and not a Wallachian) name: Gelou. On this question see another 
monograph by Makkay: Hogyan lettek a blakokbol romdnok [How the Blacs 
became Rumanians] (Budapest: published by the author, 1997). 
Tibor Frank. Egy emigrdns alakvdltasai. Zerff'i Gusztav palyakepe, 
1820-1892 [The Metamorphosis of an Emigrant. The Life-Career of 
Gusztav Zerffi, 1820-I892J. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1985. 330 
pages, 73 illustrations. Japanese edition: Tokyo: Sairyusha Publish-
ers, 1994. 
During the past two centuries or so, Hungary had contributed its share to the 
list of international soldiers-of-fortunc, including those who — while treading in 
murky waters — managed to achieved some international fame. Their lines 
stretch from Count Maurice Benyovszky (1741-1786) to Ignatius Trebitsch-
Lincoln (1879-1943) and beyond. The former of these died as the uncrowned 
"King of Madagascar," while the hitter — after spying for seven countries and 
going through four different religions — ended his career under the name of 
Chao-Kung as the abbot of a Buddhist Monastery in Shanghai. 
The ranks of these soldiers-of-fortune included many others, among them 
Gusztav Zerffi, the "hero" of the work under review. The son of an assimilated 
Hungarian of German-Jewish extraction, Zerffi was born in Buda, who during 
the 1840s became involved in the Hungarian Reform Movement. Initially Zerffi 
was an ardent critic of Hungarian populist nationalism and populist literature as 
represented by Sandor Petofi (1823-1849), but then during the Revolution of 
1848-1849 he joined the ranks of the anti-Habsburg forces. He worked in close 
cooperation with the radicals congregating around the "Minister for Police" 
Laszlo Madarasz (1811-1909), while rising to the rank of a captain in the Hun-
garian revolutionary army. Then, after the defeat of the Hungarian War of 
Independence in August 1849, he fled to Turkey along with Kossuth and many 
other revolutionaries. 
Zerffi's dedication to the Hungarian national cause abated soon after his 
Right from Hungary. He became a paid informer of the Habsburg Imperial 
Government as early as November 1849, and remained in the service of the 
Austrian spy system until January 1865. In the course of these fifteen years — 
while living in Turkey, Italy, France and England — Zerffi wrote close to a 
thousand spy reports on the activities of the Hungarian immigration. Even so, 
with the change of the political conditions and the imminence of the Austro-
-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, he was unceremoniously dismissed. 
Having been cast aside by his former masters, Zerffi went through a 
major metamorphosis and gradually transformed himself into a learned scholar-
-author of art history and historiography. He also became one of the founding 
members of The Royal Historical Society in London. By the 1870s Zerffi 
accumulated sufficient scholarly prestige that the Japanese commissioned him to 
write a historiographical handbook for their emerging historical profession in 
Japan. The book appeared under the title The Science of History in 1879, an it 
was followed within a year by Zerffi's election to the Chairmanship of the 
Council of The Royal Historical Society. 
Tibor Frank's portrayal of Gusztav Zerffi is both solid and convincing. It 
reflects phenomenal amount of scholarly research in over dozen archives and 
half a dozen countries stretching from Britain to Japan. It also shows commen-
dable critical thinking on the part of the author in handling the accumulated 
historical sources. 
The book is supplemented by an extensive bibliography, a list of Zerffi 's 
publications, a broad selection from his secret reports to Vienna, seventy-three 
illustrations, as well as a name index that facilitates the use of this volume. 
Tibor Frank's Egy emigrdns alakvdltdsai is a work of considerable 
importance that throws much light upon the inner life, activities and mind-set of 
the post-revolutionary "Kossuth-emigration." The Japanese have found it signifi-
cant enough to have it published in a Japanese translation. It is an example that 
should also be followed by Anglo-American scholarship. 
Steven Be!a Vardy 
Duquesne University 
Two Hungarian studies journals: Hungarian Studies (Budapest and 
Bloomington, Indiana), and Rivista di studi ungheresi (Rome). 
The International Hungarian Studies Association (1HSA) was formed in 1979 
at the initiative of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Its periodical, the semi-
annual Hungarian Studies iHS) , was first published in 1985. Vilmos Voigt, 
professor of ethnology, was managing editor for three years. In 1988 the literary 
scholar Mihaly Szegedy-Maszak became Editor-in-Chief. When he got an 
appointment at Indiana University, the journal's editorial activities were split 
between two continents, although its publisher-distributor continued to be the 
Akademiai Kiado (Academic Publishing House) in Budapest. The association, 
the journal, and the academy thus form a cooperative triangle. 
When the IHSA was established, it was spelled out that the association's 
mandate would not covcr studies in history, which was a closely watched field in 
communist Hungary. Similarly to its sponsor HS, too, adhered to the policy of 
shunning contributions on modern Hungarian history until the nineteen-nineties 
(except for history as an auxiliary of literature and other kinds of disciplines). 
One fascinating asset of the journal is the variety of contributors, disci-
plines, and — to a lesser degree — languages. Understandably, an almost 
eclectic search for a lasting profile characterized the first few volumes, which 
coincided with decisive.changes in actual politics. Especially in earlier volumes 
surveys of relevant institutional activities (such as reports on congresses and 
symposia, the state of Hungarian Studies in various countries, and the like) were 
frequent, while in recent years they have virtually disappeared. Same goes for 
the book reviews. On the other hand, special issues or sections started appearing 
about such topics as North American Hungarians (vol. 7), early 20th century 
Hungary (vol. 9), and religion in Hungary (vol. 10). Some of these materials 
derive from conferences organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and 
the chair of Hungarian Studies at Indiana University. Experience proves !hat this 
kind of publication of topically related research is a good idea, as it lends focus 
to the issues. Naturally, mixed issues should also keep appearing to accommo-
date hard-to-classify submissions. 
HS is now in its fourteenth year of publication — or it should be, were it 
not set back by chronic delays, as so many scholarly periodicals are nowadays. It 
is to be hoped that the journal will print, sooner or later, a cumulative index of 
its rich past. There are a number of similarities between our Hungarian Studies 
Review and HS. Both are published by an association ("ours" by the Hungarian 
Studies Association of Canada, HS by the IHSA), both have gone through 
critical times of structural changes - and, above all, both are fighting against 
formidable odds, financially as well as due to the curse of our discipline, 
Hungarian Studies. As we know, our culture cannot be attached to other fields of 
inquiry easily. Some renowned scholars dealing with Hungary publish their 
research in journals of their respective discipline rather than the two interdisci-
plinary Hungarian studies periodicals. Several familiar names could be also 
mentioned who published in HS, but never in the Hungarian Studies Review, and 
vice versa. 
HS and the Review are the only two periodicals which represent Hungar-
ian culture exclusively, and in an interdisciplinary way, to readers unfamiliar 
with the Hungarian language. The relationship between the two periodicals has 
been amicable. We wish HS many more years of successful publication. 
The Italian Inter-University Centre for Hungarian Studies was established in 
1985 with the purpose to provide coordination for the activities of teachers and 
scholars of Hungarian at nine universities of the country. In 1986 the yearbook 
Rivista di studi ungheresi was launched. Both the Centre and the editorial office 
are located at the University of Rome "La Sapienza," where Professor Peter 
Sarkozy, holder of the Chair of Hungarian Studies, has fulfilled directorial duties 
of the former and editorship of the latter with unflagging energy and efficiency. 
The yearbook is now in its twelfth year of publication, and is supported by the 
Italian government's National Research Centre. 
Already from the start the Rivista was more oriented to a general reader-
ship than the two North American journals. Non-docurnented essays, reminis-
cences, and similar genres that fall close to belles lettres were printed frequently 
in the first issues, perhaps less so in the more recent ones. Reports on con-
gresses, reviews of the state of research at different scholarly centres, and book 
reviews are regular features. The subject matter ranges widely, with literary 
scholarship and history taking about equal proportions in dominating over other 
topics. There is a close cooperation between the Department of Comparative 
Literature and the Hungarian Chair at the University of Rome. Methods of 
comparative inquiries in Hungarian literature fall into the categories of influence 
studies, reception studies and imagology. 
Italian and Hungarian cultural relations look back at a long history, and 
the fact that Hungarian language or some aspect of culture is taught at nine 
universities provides an enviable pool of resources. Italian studies are equally 
well developed in Hungary, adding even more names to the editorial list of 
contributors. A third group is that of the international contributors, so far from 
ten countries, among others from Canada. This latter contact is especially strong, 
due to the (non-codified) cooperation between the chairs of Hungarian Studies in 
Rome and Toronto. The two institutions have had several shared projects, such 
as mutual invitations to conferences, simultaneous publication of the papers 
delivered by Italian colleagues (about the Hungarian Renaissance) at the 
University of Toronto's Fourth Hungarian Studies Conference (1989), and regular 
exchange of information about each other's ongoing activities. 
The language of the Rivista is overwhelmingly Italian, although publica-
tions have also appeared in other major languages. One of these, Shayne 
Mitchell's "An Italian Account of the Hungarian Peasant Revolt of 1514" (in vol. 
8) is particularly interesting. Less regularly than the two North American 
journals, the Rivista has published special issues or thematic sections. In 1989, it 
commemorated the 500th anniversary of King Matthias's death, and in 1996, a 
whole issue was dedicated to Finno-Ugric Studies. 
Unlike English, Italian is not a language of international communication. 
Even so, it is spoken by some 60 million people, not counting the diaspora. 
News from Hungary attracts surprisingly wide interest. The Rivista has an 
important mission, and it performs this mission conscientiously and successfully. 
George Bisztray 
University of Toronto 
Attila Pal adi-Ko vacs. Ethnic Traditions, Classes and Communities in 
Hungary. Budapest: Institute of Ethnology, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, 1996. 217 pages. 
This book by the Director of the Institute of Ethnology of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences is a collection of twelve essays, all of which — with the 
exception of the first one — were presented at various international congresses 
or symposia, and the majority of which have already appeared in print. Collec-
tively these essay deal with the "social classes, strata and occupation groups of 
the Hungarian people" within the Carpathian Basin, and area that for the better 
part of a millennium used to constitute Historic Hungary. 
Having been a multinational state through much of its existence, Hungary 
had been the homeland of close to a dozen different nationalities, each with its 
own folk traditions and way of life. Some of these ethnic groups were highly 
urbanized (like the Germans, the Jews, and many of the Hungarians), while most 
of the others were on various levels of rural and pastoral existence. They each 
had their own social elites. But by virtue of being part of the Hungarian state, 
the latter generally became members of the Hungarian nobility and the Hungar-
ian honoratior class, and then gradually assimilated into the Hungarian nation. 
Paladi-Kovacs docs touches upon the society and culture of most of these ethnic 
groups, but his essays deal primarily with the Hungarians or the Magyars, who 
constituted the state-forming nation and the leading nationality of Historic 
Hungary. 
Of the enclosed twelve studies, the longest and perhaps the most interest-
ing to an outsider is the one on the society and culture of the Hungarian non-
titled nobility in the period between the 16th through the 19th centuries (pp. 
9-62). This study was originally written for a major Hungarian handbook entitled 
Magyar neprajz [Hungarian Ethnography], but for some unexplained reason it 
never appeared in print until now. This essay describes the various strata of the 
Hungarian nobility, their social organization and authority, their estates, man-
sions and clothing, their marriage customs, family relations and personal names, 
their social contacts and forms of greetings, their relationship to the church 
hierarchy, as well as their mentality and the level of their national consciousness. 
The author therefore presents a comprehensive picture of the Hungarian noble 
class, a portrait that can be of some use even to the specialists of Hungarian 
history. 
The second essay surveys Hungary's ethnic composition both before and 
after the country's dismemberment in 1919-1920 (pp. 63-78). It is a balanced 
summary of Hungary's ethnic picture, with some references to the condition of 
the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states formed after the collapse of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The third essay discusses the nature of "Hungarianness" or "Hungarian 
identity" in the course of the past few centuries. In other words it tackles the 
question: what constitutes a "good Hungarian" (pp. 79-98). The author concludcs 
that being a good Hungarian includes being a good European as well as being a 
good human being. But the definition of a "good Hungarian" never included the 
need to have only Hungarian ethnic roots. 
This is followed by eight other essays on such diverse topics as: internal 
migrations within Hungary from the 18th through the 20th centuries (pp. 
99-112); division of labour and work specialization by the various ethnic and 
nationality groups in traditional Hungary (pp. 113-126); exchange of children 
and child apprentices among the country's various regions and peoples, leading 
to the knowledge of languages and to the mutual understanding of each other's 
peculiarities (pp. 127-140); continuity and increasing discontinuity of Hungarian 
folk customs and traditions among the country's rural population (pp. 141-152); 
role and work habits of the oldest generation of rural inhabitants in late-20th-
century Hungarian villages (pp. 153-163); system of commuting by rural workers 
to new industrial centres, illustrated by the case of the industrial town of Ozd in 
northern Hungary (pp. 165-176); development and nature of industrial workers' 
culture during the post-World War II period (pp. 177-188); changes in the use of 
Historical sources in Hungarian ethnographical research (pp. 189-200); and the 
development of Hungarian ethnographical cartography in the second half of the 
20th century (pp. 201-209). The volume is complemented by forty-three illust-
rations (pp. 21 1-214), and by a list of the most important geographical names in 
several languages for places now outside of Hungary (pp. 215-217). 
Paladi-Kovacs's work is a book of pedantic scholarship, which at the 
same lime is also easy reading. It can be read effortlessly and with much profit 
by anyone interested in the ethnic traditions of the people of Hungary. Fortu-
nately it is available in English, which makes it all the more valuable for people 
in the related disciplines. 
Steven Bela Vardy 
Duquesne University 
Tibor Giant, "Roosevelt, Apponyi es a Habsburg Monarchia" [Roose-
velt, Apponyi and the Habsburg Monarchy], Szazadok 131 (1997), 
pp. 1386-1401. 
It is not a part of the North American academic tradition to review articles in 
scholarly journals. An exception is made here because the subject of the article 
at hand is of interest to Hungarian Americans — as well as North American 
historians who study Hungary and, especially, Hungarian-American relations. 
That subject is the friendship that existed between American President Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Hungarian statesman Count Albert Apponyi. The story of this 
relationship has been told by historian Tibor Giant of Kossuth Lajos University 
of Debrecen. 
In his study Giant claims that the friendship of Roosevelt and Apponyi 
amounted to the most important unofficial tie between Hungary and the USA 
from 1904 to the time of World War I, and wonders what would have happened 
to Hungary at the end of the war if in 1918-1919 Roosevelt and not Woodrow 
Wilson had been US President. 
As those who have studied American history know, Theodore "Teddy" 
Roosevelt (1858-1919), the "hero" of America's war against Spain, was electcd 
the governor of New York State in 1898, became vice-President of the US in 
1901, and succccdcd President McKinley after he was assassinated in the same 
year. Roosevelt served as President until 1909. In 1912 he tried to make a 
political comeback, but failed. Nevertheless, he remained an influential political 
figure until his death. 
Count Albert Apponyi (1846-1933) was an eminent figure on the 
Hungarian political scene during the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
the first three decades of the twentieth. From 1906 to 1910, and again in 1916-
1918, he served as Hungary's minister of cults and education. After the war he 
was the head of Hungary's peace delegation, and from 1923 to his death a 
decade later he served as Hungary's chief delegate to the League of Nations. 
Giant compares and contrasts the two men's backgrounds, careers, and 
ideas. He points out that, despite the great differences between them (Roosevelt 
was very much a man of action, while Apponyi was a man of words), the two 
shared characteristics and ideals, including knowledge of foreign languages, 
interest in other cultures, and the desire to promote of world peace. It was 
shared interests and beliefs that brought the two together and made them friends. 
During their occasional personal meetings Roosevelt used to address Apponyi as 
"my dear Count." 
In describing the meetings the two men had over the years, Giant 
discusses the incidents which reveal that Roosevelt had a good knowledge of 
Austria-Hungary's affairs. Much to Apponyi's surprise, Roosevelt on one 
occasion also talked about Hungary's history, recollecting little-known names and 
minor events. Apparently, he read about the subject dccades earlier, and could 
still remember much of what he had read. 
More important than the meetings the two men had, was the correspon-
dence that they conducted from 1904 lo 1915. This correspondence reveals 
Roosevelt's concern for the continued survival of Austria-Hungary, especially 
during the political crisis of 1905-06. To help to resolve this crisis Roosevelt 
took farsighted actions. Among other things he counselled Apponyi to advise his 
countrymen that the Habsburg Monarchy should be maintained intact. Though 
Roosevelt was evidently against the idea of Hungary separating from Austria at 
the time, his letters to Apponyi reveal that he did not reject the possibility of 
Hungary gaining her independence at some time in the future. 
The two men's friendship continued after Roosevelt's departure from the 
White House. The ex-president visited Hungary in 1910 and, for part of this 
visit, Apponyi acted as his host. The following year it was Apponyi's turn to 
tour the United States and, during this visit, he stayed for nearly two days with 
the Roosevelts. In their conversations on this occasion, the two disagreed for the 
first time on the question of the resolution of international disputes, with 
Roosevelt endorsing the idea of the use of force as a last resort, and Apponyi 
opposing the idea of military intervention in such cases. 
Though they never met again, their correspondence continued. On the eve 
of World War 1, Roosevelt remarked in one of his letters to Apponyi that he 
hoped a world conflict could be avoided, because if it broke out, it would be a 
great tragedy for mankind. 
In 1915 the Roosevelt-Apponyi friendship became a casualty of the war. 
They continued to exchange letters, but it soon became obvious that the war had 
accentuated their differences. Apponyi's increasingly pro-German stance irritated 
Roosevelt who put an end to their correspondence not long after German 
submarines sank an American ocean liner, the Lusitania. 
In the concluding section of his article Giant explores the question 
whether Hungary might not have been better off in the post-war restructuring of 
Europe with Roosevelt in the White House instead of Wilson. He points out 
that, despite the cooling of his relationship with Apponyi, Roosevelt remained 
sympathetic to Hungary, and for a long time avoided association with the people 
who demanded Hungary's dismemberment. By war's end, however, Roosevelt 
had abandoned his belief in the necessity of Austria-Hungary's preservation. 
After a lengthy analysis of Roosevelt's post-1915 attitudes, Giant comes to the 
conclusion that it probably would not have made much difference for Hungary's 
future whether Wilson or Roosevelt had occupied the White House during the 
war and at war's end. 
Giant's study is based on a wide variety of primary sources and consti-
tutes an important contribution to our knowledge of Hungarian-American rela-
tions. Hopefully it will become available in English translation in the not too 
distant future. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
Royal Military College of Canada 
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A NOTE FROM THE EDITORS: 
We apologize for our continued tardiness in the publication of our journal. The 
reasons for this are legion, and we do not want to offer any explanations here. 
There is hope that within the next few years, we might be able to catch up with 
our publishing schedule, as we have three special issues in the making, each of 
which should make up a substantial part of an annual volume. In particular, 
Oliver Botar of the University of Manitoba has been working on a small volume 
of essays on Hungarian-Canadian art and artists. Recently, Agatha Schwartz, 
German Section Head, Department of Modern Languages and Literatures at the 
the University of Ottawa, has embarked on editing a collection of essays on the 
subject of Hungarian women in literature and the media. And, Janos Miska of 
Victoria, B.C., has been working on a still another update of his bibliography of 
things Hungarian-Canadian. With these special issues in the making, along with 
the manuscripts at hand (and those promised), we expect to increase the fre-
quency of our journal 's appearance during the next two years and hope that in 
2000 we will publish the volume slated for 2000 (vol. 27)! 
G.B. and N.F.D. 


